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In recent decades, public school buildings have become increasingly 
important venues for religious worship services.1  This is an outgrowth of two 
factors.  First, school districts today commonly make their facilities available 
during non-school hours to a variety of community groups.  This partially 
reflects schools’ desire to support local community activity, but in many cases 
they also have significant financial incentives to charge rent for the space.  
School district community-use policies are typically open to a range of uses and 
groups, including religious, thus making the space available to religious groups.  
Indeed, excluding religious uses from a school-created forum could potentially 
violate the First Amendment, as reflected in a series of Supreme Court 
decisions.2 
Second, churches themselves are often in need of space for worship services.  
This is particularly true of new, start-up churches, which typically do not have 
the resources to secure a permanent building.  Although many use old 
storefronts or rent space from existing churches, an increasing number of new 
churches initially use school facilities.3 
In many respects, this has been a comfortable arrangement for both schools 
and churches.  School buildings are rarely used on Sunday mornings, and 
churches can set up and take down any equipment they might need with no 
interference to school operations.  A school building is spacious enough to 
accommodate large numbers of worshippers, while also providing separate 
 
 *   Professor, College of Law, Northern Illinois University. 
 1.  See Cathy Lynn Grossman & Natalie DiBlasio, ‘Instant Churches’ Convert Public Schools to 
Worship Spaces, USA TODAY (July 19, 2011), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/religion/2011-07-18-
portable-churches-worship-schools_n.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/97LZ-WJGF.  A 2011 research survey 
by USA Today of the five largest school districts and the five fastest growing school districts in the country 
showed that all ten districts permitted weekend worship services in their buildings.  See id.  Among the five 
largest districts, 25% of the schools in the Miami-Dade School Districts had issued permits for weekend 
services, 7% for the Chicago School District, 7% for the Clark County School District (Las Vegas), 4% for the 
Los Angeles School District, and 3.5% for the New York School District.  See id. 
 2.  See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 120 (2001); Rosenberger v. Rector & 
Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 831-46 (1995); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 
508 U.S. 384, 393-95 (1993); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 273 (1981). 
 3.  See Grossman & DiBlasio, supra note 1 (noting survey found 12% of Protestant churches met in 
schools).  Out of 350 churches started by the Acts 29 Network of church plants, 16% met in schools.  Id. 
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rooms for nursery care and Sunday school classes.  At the same time, cash-
strapped school districts appreciate the extra income that rental of the space 
provides.  Allowing religious services in public schools reflects 
accommodation of religion, a cherished American tradition.4  It is not 
surprising, therefore, that an increasing number of new churches use school 
facilities when they first open. 
Nevertheless, the inclusion or exclusion of religious worship services in 
public schools raises a variety of First Amendment issues.  On the one hand, 
school districts have no obligation to allow churches or any other community 
group to use their facilities during non-school hours, no matter how pressing 
the need.  Schools are not a traditional forum, and are free to shut their doors to 
the community.5  On the other hand, to allow churches, but not others, to use 
school facilities would clearly violate the Establishment Clause6 and most 
likely the Free Speech Clause.7  This much is clear. 
But in the typical situation where schools open their facilities to community 
groups, the constitutional issue raised by including or excluding religious 
worship is more nuanced.  In particular, does church use of school facilities for 
religious worship services, which almost all community-use policies allow, 
violate the Establishment Clause by allowing a core and quintessentially 
religious activity on school grounds?  Conversely, does excluding religious 
worship because of Establishment Clause sensibilities from an otherwise broad 
community-use program violate the Free Speech or Free Exercise clauses? 
The Supreme Court has not directly addressed these issues.  However, the 
Court has addressed instances where religious speech and activity has been 
excluded from school-created fora for either student or community groups 
because of perceived Establishment Clause concerns. In a series of five 
analogous cases, the Court held that the exclusion of religious speech from a 
school-created forum violates the Free Speech Clause, and the inclusion of such 
 
 4.  See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1952) (stating “best of our traditions” encourages 
accommodating religious needs). 
 5.  See Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 390-91 (holding school property not traditional forum but instead 
limited forum for designated purposes). 
 6.  The Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence is in a state of flux, with the Court 
applying several different tests depending on the case.  See Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 
2002) (discussing variety of Supreme Court approaches to Establishment Clause).  These approaches include 
whether a government act results in coercion of a religious practice resulting in government endorsement of 
religion, whether the government act’s purpose is to advance religion, and whether the act is neutral towards 
religion.  Cf. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 580 (1992) (discussing clerical members offering prayer before 
school graduation against Establishment Clause).  Although only allowing churches access to school facilities 
would not result in coercion of religion, it almost certainly would constitute state endorsement of religion from 
the perspective of an objective observer and would fail to treat religion neutrally.  It might also be seen as 
designed to advance religion. 
 7.  The Free Speech Clause requires that regulations be content-neutral, prohibiting both favorable and 
unfavorable treatment based on content.  See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988); Carey v. Brown, 
447 U.S. 455, 462 (1980); Police Dep’t of City of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). 
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speech does not violate the Establishment Clause.8 
It is somewhat surprising, therefore, that in two decisions arising from 
litigation involving The Bronx Household of Faith (Bronx Household), the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that exclusion of religious worship 
services from a community-use forum did not violate the Constitution.9  In 
these cases, the court reviewed and upheld a New York School District policy 
that allowed use of school facilities for various community activities during 
after-school hours, but specifically prohibited use of schools for religious 
worship services.  Bronx Household challenged the policy, claiming that it 
discriminated against religious viewpoints and was thus unconstitutional.  In 
litigation stretching back almost two decades, the Second Circuit ultimately 
held in two decisions that exclusion of religious worship services from an 
otherwise broad community forum violated neither the Free Speech Clause nor 
Free Exercise Clause, and was therefore constitutional.10  In doing so, the court 
also strongly suggested that to include religious worship services in such a 
forum would violate the Establishment Clause. 
In the first decision, Bronx Household of Faith v. Board of Education of City 
of New York (Bronx Household IV), the Second Circuit addressed the free 
speech issue, concluding that exclusion of worship services did not violate the 
First Amendment.11  In doing so, the court characterized the worship exclusion 
as banning a type of activity, rather than a point of view, such that it was 
distinguishable from Supreme Court cases and valid.12  It also stressed that the 
worship service ban was reasonable in light of the potential Establishment 
Clause problems posed by permitting worship services on school property.  
Although the court was careful to state that it was not deciding whether the 
worship services would in fact violate the Establishment Clause, only that it 
was reasonable to believe it would, the tone of the opinion strongly suggested 
that it would likely violate the Establishment Clause.13  Indeed, in several 
places the court stated that there was a “strong basis” to believe that allowing 
worship on public school property would violate the Establishment Clause.14 
Since the district court and Second Circuit had only addressed the Free 
 
 8.  See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 120 (2001); Rosenberger v. Rector & 
Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 831-46 (1995); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 
508 U.S. 384, 393-95 (1993); Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 253 (1990); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 
U.S. 263, 273 (1981). 
 9.  See Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ. (Bronx Household V), 750 F.3d 184 (2d Cir. 2014); 
Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ. (Bronx Household IV), 650 F.3d 30 (2d Cir. 2011).  The Bronx 
Household litigation history is long and complex.  See infra Part II.  The numerical designations for the two 
cases discussed in this article (IV and V) follow those used by the Second Circuit. 
 10.  See infra Part II, Part V.B (discussing litigation history). 
 11.  See 650 F.3d at 46-47. 
 12.  See id. at 36-37. 
 13.  See id. at 40. 
 14.  See id. at 40, 51. 
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Speech and Establishment Clause issues in Bronx Household IV, but not 
whether exclusion of worship services violated the free exercise of religion, the 
church again sought an injunction against enforcement of the policy—this time 
on Free Exercise grounds.  The district court held that exclusion of worship 
violated the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause, and the case returned to 
the Second Circuit.15  In Bronx Household of Faith v. Board of Education of 
City of New York (Bronx Household V), the Second Circuit again rejected the 
church’s constitutional claim, finding that exclusion of worship services did not 
violate the Free Exercise Clause.16 
Despite the rather complicated history of the Bronx Household litigation, the 
bottom line is rather straightforward.  The Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
held that exclusion of religious worship services from a broad forum that 
allows outside groups to use school facilities does not violate the Free Speech 
Clause or Free Exercise Clause, and strongly suggested that the inclusion of 
worship services in the forum would violate the Establishment Clause.17  
Although the Second Circuit was careful to couch its analysis in the particular 
language of the New York School District community-use policy, as a practical 
matter, the court’s reasoning and analysis relates to almost any public school 
policy regarding community use of its facilities.  As suggested above, the issue 
is extremely important, as numerous public school districts allow community 
groups, including churches and other religious groups, to use their facilities 
during non-school hours. 
This article will examine the issue of using public school space for worship, 
arguing that the Second Circuit was wrong in its Free Speech Clause, 
Establishment Clause, and Free Exercise Clause analysis.18  First, the court was 
incorrect to characterize worship services as conduct rather than speech.  Even 
 
 15.  See Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ. (Bronx Household IV.A), 876 F. Supp. 2d 419, 437 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d, 331 F.3d 342 (2d Cir. 2003).  The numerical designation for this case has been adjusted 
to accommodate the Second Circuit’s designations.  See supra note 9. 
 16.  See Bronx Household V, 750 F.3d 184, 190 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 17.  See infra Part II.B, Part V.B. 
 18.  A number of articles have addressed the issues raised by the Bronx Household cases at earlier stages 
in the litigation.  None of the articles address the Free Exercise issue, and most precede the Second Circuit’s 
final resolution of the Free Speech issue.  See generally Richard Esenberg, Of Speeches and Sermons:  Worship 
in Limited Purpose Public Forums, 78 MISS. L.J. 453 (2009); Christine Kiracofe, The Constitutional 
Parameters of Renting Public School Space for Weekend Worship Services:  An Analysis of 15+ Years of Case 
Law in Bronx Household of Faith v. New York, 287 ED. L. REP. 663 (2013); Hannah N. Burnidge, Comment, 
Expelling the Church:  An Examination of the Constitutionality of the Second Circuit’s Approval of a Public 
School District’s Policy That Excludes Worship Services, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1315 (2012); Kevin Fiet, Note & 
Comment, The Bronx Household of Faith:  Looking at the Unanswered Questions, 2007 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L. J. 
153 (2007); William A. Glaser, Comments, Worshipping Separation:  Worship in Limited Public Forums and 
the Establishment Clause, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 1053 (2011); Nicholas Matich, Note, Forum Domination:  
Religious Speech in Extremely Limited Public Fora, 98 VA. L. REV. 1149 (2012); John Tyler, Comment, Is 
Worship a Unique Subject or a Way of Approaching Many Different Subjects?  Two Recent Decisions That 
Attempt To Answer this Question Set the Second and Ninth Circuits on a Course Toward State Entanglement 
with Religion, 59 MERCER L. REV. 1319 (2008). 
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if the school-use policy created a limited public forum, worship services are 
inherently expressive activities.  Therefore, under Supreme Court precedent, 
the exclusion of worship services should be seen as viewpoint discrimination.  
The fact that religious views can be expressed in other contexts, such as Bible 
studies, fails to recognize that the means of communication are inherently part 
of the message.  This is particularly true with worship, where the form of 
communication is an integral and essential aspect of communicating views of 
faith. 
Second, the court was incorrect to state there was a “strong basis” to believe 
that renting facilities to churches for worship services would violate the 
Establishment Clause.  The Supreme Court’s emphasis on neutrality in prior 
limited forum cases involving religious speech strongly suggests the neutral 
treatment of worship would mitigate Establishment Clause concerns that might 
otherwise exist.19  In particular, any concerns about perceived government 
endorsement of religion, the primary emphasis of the court in the Bronx 
Household litigation, are eliminated by a neutral treatment of religion.20 
Third, the Second Circuit was also incorrect in concluding that excluding 
worship services from the school-use policy would not violate the Free 
Exercise Clause.  This is admittedly a closer issue, because the Supreme Court 
has indicated that the Free Exercise Clause will tolerate limited disfavorable 
treatment of religion.21  Yet a careful reading of precedent suggests it is limited 
to instances of an extremely strong Establishment Clause concern, which is 
absent in the Bronx Household cases.  As such, the Supreme Court’s general 
rule that targeting religion for unfavorable treatment triggers strict scrutiny 
should govern, making the policy unconstitutional. 
Part I of this Article will provide background to the issue of using public 
school space for religious worship, examining three contexts in which the 
Supreme Court has examined religion in public schools:  release time 
programs, prayer, and limited public forum cases.  Part II will then analyze the 
Second Circuit’s decision in Bronx Household IV.  Next, part III will discuss 
whether excluding worship services from a limited public forum in public 
schools violates the Free Speech Clause.  Part IV will then discuss whether 
permitting worship services in public schools violates the Establishment 
Clause.  Finally, part V will discuss the Second Circuit’s decision in Bronx 
Household V, and examine whether exclusion of religious worship from a 
limited public forum violates the Free Exercise Clause. 
 
 19.  See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 839-40 (1995); Lamb’s Chapel 
v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 395 (1993). 
 20.  See Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 395 (indicating granting religious access poses “no realistic danger” 
of endorsing religion); Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 248 (1990) (plurality opinion) (granting 
religious groups equal access to facilities communicates neutrality, rather than endorsement). 
 21.  See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718-19, 725 (2004) (explaining “play in the joints” permits minor 
burdens on religion if substantial Establishment Clause concern). 
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I.  BACKGROUND:  RELIGION AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
Religion in public schools is one of the most controversial areas in 
constitutional law, generating strong feelings on both sides of the argument.  
This section will not attempt to review every issue the Supreme Court has 
addressed, but will examine three areas of importance:  release time programs, 
prayer in public schools, and religious speech in limited public school forums.  
The last category, which is most analogous to making public school facilities 
available for religious worship, will receive special attention, as it raises the 
dual concerns of free speech and the Establishment Clause. 
A.  Release Time Programs 
The Supreme Court’s introduction to the issue of religion in public schools 
occurred in two early cases involving “release time” programs, where students 
are released from public schools for private religious instruction.  The first 
case, McCollum v. Board of Education,22 involved a program in which some 
public school children were released from their classes to attend religious 
instruction classes of their chosen faith in classrooms at the school.23  The 
program was voluntary and students were only released with the approval of 
their parents.  The religious classes were taught by private teachers of the 
relevant faith who did not receive any compensation from the state.  Students 
who did not participate in the program were sent to special rooms for secular 
studies.24 
The Court held that the program violated the Establishment Clause, 
describing it as a program that uses tax-supported public schools “to aid 
religious groups to spread their faith.”25  In reaching this conclusion, the Court 
stressed several factors—in particular, the close cooperation between the school 
district and religious authorities in promoting religious education, as well as the 
use of school property for religious instruction.  The Court not only noted that 
the “tax-supported public school system” was used to spread religious doctrine, 
but also that the state provided religion “an invaluable aid in that it help[ed] to 
provide pupils for their religious classes through use of the state’s compulsory 
[education] machinery.”26 
Four years later, the Court again reviewed a release time program in Zorach 
v. Clauson,27 but this time found the program constitutional.  Although similar 
in many respects to the program rejected in McCollum, the program in Zorach 
permitted schools to release students during the school day to attend religious 
 
 22.  333 U.S. 203 (1948). 
 23.  Id. at 208-09. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. at 210. 
 26.  See McCollum, 333 U.S. at 210, 212. 
 27.  343 U.S. 306 (1952). 
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instruction at private, off-campus sites.28  The Court found this distinction 
crucial, stating that in McCollum, the use of the classrooms involved the force 
of the schools to promote religious instruction.29  In contrast, the Court in 
Zorach said the schools merely accommodated “their schedules to a program of 
outside religious instruction.”30 
Significantly, the Court in Zorach stressed the importance of 
accommodating religious practice.  In an often-quoted passage the Court stated: 
 
We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.  We 
guarantee the freedom to worship as one chooses. . . . When the state 
encourages religious instruction or cooperates with religious authorities by 
adjusting the schedule of public events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of 
our traditions.  For it then respects the religious nature of our people and 
accommodates the public service to their spiritual needs.  To hold that it may 
not would . . . show a callous indifference to religious groups.31 
 
Zorach reflects a very expansive understanding of how government 
generally, and public schools in particular, can accommodate religious activity.  
True, the distinction between Zorach and McCollum turned on the use of public 
school property to propagate religious doctrine, which the Court found 
unconstitutional.  This distinction must be understood, however, in the context 
of the case, which involved the use of school classrooms during the school day 
for religious instruction to public school students, albeit with voluntary 
instruction.32  Further, it was not part of a broad community policy, but instead 
designed only to assist religious groups.  The Court characterized religious 
services held in public school facilities as essentially co-opting the public 
school system to provide students for religious instruction.33  That is a far cry 
from the use of school facilities on Sunday mornings, which is far removed 
from class time and devoid of any cooperation of school officials to facilitate 
attending the service.  The broader and more meaningful message of the two 
cases, and especially Zorach, is that government accommodation of religious 
exercise is constitutional.34 
B.  School Prayer Cases 
There are few issues more controversial than prayer in public schools, and 
 
 28.  See id. at 308, 315 (drawing distinction from McCollum). 
 29.  Id. at 315. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Zorach, 343 U.S. at 313-14. 
 32.  See McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948). 
 33.  See id. at 210-12. 
 34.  See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-15 (1952) (permitting release time program). 
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the Supreme Court has vigilantly monitored this practice.  Indeed, in all five 
major cases in this area the Court has held prayer in public schools 
unconstitutional.35  However, a close reading of these cases, together with the 
public forum cases discussed in the next subsection, indicates that the problem 
is not prayer in school itself, but rather government-promoted prayers.  Indeed, 
while the Court has been quick to strike down any state-promoted religious 
practice in school, it has frequently noted that student-initiated prayer is 
permitted, and at times, constitutionally protected.36 
The Court first held school-mandated prayer to be unconstitutional in two 
landmark decisions in the early 1960s, Engel v. Vitale and Abington School 
District v. Schempp.  In the first case, Engel, the Court reviewed a school board 
policy requiring that the following prayer be said aloud by each class at the 
start of the school day:   “Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence 
upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and 
our Country.”37  The school district itself had adopted this practice upon the 
recommendation of the New York State Board of Regents.38  The required 
prayer recitation was challenged as unconstitutional by parents who alleged that 
use of an official state prayer violated their family’s religious beliefs.39 
In finding that this practice violated the Establishment Clause, the Court 
primarily focused on the fact that students were required to recite a 
government-composed prayer.40  The Court noted that, at a minimum, the 
Establishment Clause means “it is no part of the business of government to 
compose official prayers for any group of the American people to recite as a 
part of a religious program carried on by government.”41  In reaching this 
conclusion, the Court discussed in-depth how the “practice of establishing 
governmentally composed prayers for religious services was one of the 
reasons” early colonists left England.42  Thus, according to the Court, the 
primary problem was not the potential coercion of students, which would likely 
occur, but rather that government had no right “to control, support or influence 
the kinds of prayer the American people can say.”43 
 
 35.  See generally Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 
(1992); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. 
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
 36.  See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 302 (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990) (plurality 
opinion)) (permitting student-initiated prayer at football game). 
 37.  Engel, 370 U.S. at 422 (detailing prayer requirement). 
 38.  Id. at 422-23. 
 39.  Id. at 423 (explaining constitutional challenge). 
 40.  See id. at 424 (holding requirement violates Establishment Clause). 
 41.  Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425 (1962). 
 42.  Id.  The Court discussed the early colonists’ experience with the Book of Common Prayer, in which 
the British government imposed the form and content of prayer to be used in the Church of England.  Id.  This 
created enormous conflicts, as various religious groups sought to influence the composition of the book to 
advance their own religious beliefs.  Id. at 425-27 (detailing historical context). 
 43.  Id. at 429.  The Court also rejected the argument that prohibiting school prayer demonstrated 
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One year later, in Schempp, the Court again examined the issue of religious 
practices in public schools, this time involving daily Bible readings and a 
recitation of the Lord’s Prayer in classrooms.44  As in Engel, the Court held that 
these practices violated the Establishment Clause.45  The Court began its 
analysis by stating that the First Amendment requires that government be 
neutral toward religion.46  The Court then stated a two-fold test for 
withstanding an Establishment Clause challenge:  first, the government action 
must have a secular purpose; and second, the government act must have “a 
primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.”47  Noting that 
school-sponsored Bible readings and prayers are inherently religious acts, the 
Court found that the school districts were actively promoting religion in 
violation of the Establishment Clause.48 
Taken together, Engel and Schempp established that school-sponsored 
prayer in public schools violates the Establishment Clause.  Although both 
decisions were sensitive to the problem of coercion, neither decision was 
predicated on that basis.49  Rather, it was government involvement in 
promulgating official prayers, and therefore religious views, that violated the 
Establishment Clause.  At the heart of both decisions was the concern that 
government itself had no business composing or sanctioning official prayers, 
and that the Religion Clauses were designed to end government control of 
religion.50  Thus, whatever else the Establishment Clause might mean, it clearly 
prohibited the state from trying to influence how children prayed. 
Although far-reaching in some respects, the precise facts of Engel and 
Schempp concerned the rather extreme practice of state-sponsored and 
prescribed prayer in school on a daily basis.51  Beginning with Wallace v. 
 
animosity towards religion.  Id. at 433-34.  The Court responded that the contrary was true; it was precisely 
because prayer and religion are so important that we have the Religion Clauses, guaranteeing that people 
“could pray when they pleased to the God of their faith in the language they chose.”  Id. at 434-35.  The First 
Amendment was therefore not designed to eliminate or hamper religion, but to end governmental control of it, 
leaving people free to pursue religion as they chose.  Id. at 435. 
 44.  See 374 U.S. 203, 205-07 (1963) (considering whether religious exercise in public schools violates 
First Amendment).  Schempp involved two consolidated cases, both involving opening exercises in public 
schools that included daily readings from the Bible and recitation of the Lord’s Prayer.  See id. at 207, 211.  
Selected students who chose which passage to read performed Bible readings over a school intercom, while the 
Lord’s Prayer was said over the intercom and in unison by students in their classrooms.  See id. at 207.  As in 
Engel, participation was voluntary.  See id. at 205-08. 
 45.  See id. at 222 (describing history and cases associated with Establishment Clause). 
 46.  See id. at 215 (stating religious freedom requires “absolute equality before the law”). 
 47.  Id. at 222.  These requirements later became the first two prongs of the tripartite test established for 
resolving Establishment Clause issues.  See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). 
 48.  See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 223 (concluding requirement of religious exercise in public school violates 
First Amendment). 
 49.  See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430-31 (1962) (suggesting free exercise violation requires showing 
coercion, but Establishment Clause violated by establishing official religion). 
 50.  See Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963); Engel, 370 U.S. at 425. 
 51.  See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 207; Engel, 370 U.S. at 422. 
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Jaffree, decided almost twenty-five years after Engel and Schempp, the Court 
began to address school prayer in more nuanced contexts.52  In Wallace, the 
Court reviewed an Alabama statute that required a minute of silence in public 
elementary and secondary schools for the purpose of “meditation or voluntary 
prayer.”53  The statute in question was the second of three Alabama statutes 
relating to school prayer discussed by the Court.54  The statute at issue was 
similar to an earlier statute, which had referred only to “meditation” and did not 
mention prayer.55  Conversely, a third statute provided for teacher-led prayer, 
which the Supreme Court had already declared unconstitutional.56  It was only 
the statute providing for “meditation and voluntary prayer” that was before the 
Court.57 
In many respects, the statute in Wallace avoided some of the most serious 
concerns voiced by the Court in Engel and Schempp.  Most notably, no prayer 
or Bible reading was prescribed, and thus any prayer that might occur was 
completely of a student’s own choosing.58  Moreover, since no content was 
provided for prayer, there was no endorsement of an official religious view, a 
significant concern in Schempp.59  Finally, although coercion was not the focus 
of the earlier decisions, it was not even a consideration in Wallace, as it would 
not be possible to know how each student used the minute of silence. 
Despite these distinctions, the Court held that the statute violated the 
Establishment Clause, stating that the statute lacked a secular purpose and was 
clearly designed to promote school prayer.60  The Court indicated that a statute 
might be partially motivated by religion and still be constitutional, but gave two 
reasons why this was not the case here.61  First, the legislative record itself 
clearly indicated that the sole purpose of the bill was to promote prayer; the 
bill’s sponsor stated in the legislative record that the bill was an “‘effort to 
return voluntary prayer’ to the public schools.”62  Second, the Court noted that 
 
 52.  472 U.S. 38 (1985). 
 53.  See id. at 40.  The challenged statute stated: 
 
At the commencement of the first class of each day in all grades in all public schools the teacher in 
charge of the room in which each class is held may announce that a period of silence not to exceed 
one minute in duration shall be observed for meditation or voluntary prayer, and during any such 
period no other activities shall be engaged in. 
 
ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.1 (1984) (repealed 1998). 
 54.  See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 41. 
 55.  See id.; see also ALA. CODE § 16-1-20 (2014). 
 56.  See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 41; see also ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.2 (2014). 
 57.  See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 41-42. 
 58.  See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 72 (1985) (distinguishing Engel and Schempp). 
 59.  See id. 
 60.  See id. at 56 (evaluating secular purpose). 
 61.  See id. at 56. 
 62.  Wallace, 472 U.S. at 57 (citation omitted).  The bill’s sponsor also confirmed this in testimony before 
the district court, where he said his only purpose in sponsoring the bill was to return prayer to the public 
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since the prior statute already protected a student’s right to engage in prayer 
during the moment of silence at the start of the day, the added phrase, “or 
voluntary prayer,” conveyed a message of state endorsement of prayer 
activities.63  As such, it was unconstitutional. 
Wallace, therefore, made clear that the state could not promote school 
prayer, even when it left the content entirely up to individual students.64  It is 
important to emphasize, however, that Wallace did not declare all moment of 
silence statutes unconstitutional, but only those clearly designed for no other 
purpose than to promote prayer.65  Indeed, the Court strongly suggested that the 
earlier Alabama statute, which required a daily moment of silence for 
meditation, was constitutional even though students might use that time to 
pray.66  This view was stated in concurring opinions by Justices Powell and 
O’Connor, who both explicitly stated that moment of silence statutes are 
constitutional, even if some students use the time to pray.67  Any prayer that 
occurs in such a situation results from a student’s own choice, not the school’s 
choice. 
The central concern that emerged in Wallace, as in Engel and Schempp, is 
not prayer in school per se, but rather government-promoted prayer.  This same 
concern is central in two recent school prayer cases, Lee v. Weisman and Santa 
Fe Independent School District v. Doe.  In Lee the Court reviewed a school 
district policy that permitted school principals to invite clergy to offer prayers 
at middle and high school ceremonies.68  Pursuant to that policy, the principal 
at a middle school invited a rabbi to pray at a graduation ceremony.69  The 
principal gave the rabbi a pamphlet containing guidelines for the prayers, 
explaining that the prayers should be nonsectarian.70  The parent of a 
graduating student challenged inclusion of the prayers as violating the 
Establishment Clause.71 
The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that inclusion of state-controlled 
prayers at middle or high school graduations violated the Establishment 
Clause.72  Although there was some disagreement among the majority justices 
 
schools.  Id. at 57-58. 
 63.  Id. at 59. 
 64.  See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60-61 (1985) (holding school prayer in Wallace violated First 
Amendment). 
 65.  See id. 
 66.  See id. at 59.  In distinguishing the first statute from the one it struck down, the Court said that an 
“intent to return prayer to the public schools is, of course, quite different from . . . voluntary prayer during an 
appropriate moment of silence.”  Id.  The prior statute protected this right.  See id. at 59. 
 67.  See id. at 67-73 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (reasoning in-school moments of silence constitutional); 
id. at 62 (Powell, J., concurring) (explaining constitutionality of moments of silence). 
 68.  505 U.S. 577, 580-82 (1992). 
 69.  See id. 
 70.  See id. 
 71.  See id. at 581-84 (describing facts leading to issue before Court). 
 72.  See Lee, 505 U.S. at 586-87. 
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over the scope of Establishment Clause prohibitions on prayer in public 
schools, all emphasized state sponsorship of prayer as the central focus of their 
reasoning.  Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion struck down the challenged 
prayer under a coercion standard, stating that in the context of a graduation 
ceremony, a state-controlled prayer constituted an indirect, but substantial 
coercion of religious exercise.73  In reaching this conclusion, Kennedy used a 
two-step analysis.  First, he established that the prayer must be attributed to the 
state, explaining the pervasive and substantial state involvement in this case.74  
In particular, he focused on how the principal, an agent of the state, decided 
that a prayer should be offered, chose who would deliver the prayer, and 
attempted to control the content of the prayer by offering guidelines.75  Second, 
Kennedy discussed how state-sponsored prayer is unconstitutional in the 
context of a graduation ceremony because impressionable middle school 
students would feel coerced to participate.76 
Four other justices joined Kennedy’s opinion, agreeing that the coercive 
effect of the graduation prayer violated the Establishment Clause, but Justices 
Blackmun’s and Souter’s concurring opinions emphasized that coercion was a 
sufficient but not a necessary condition for an Establishment Clause violation.77  
They explained that state endorsement of religion, even without coercion, is 
enough to violate the Establishment Clause.  Additionally, they argued that 
such an endorsement existed in Lee, stressing, as did Justice Kennedy, the 
state’s integral involvement with the prayers in question.78  Indeed, Justice 
Souter suggested that there would be no state endorsement if a student speaker, 
selected by secular criteria, had individually chosen to deliver a religious 
 
 73.  See id. at 589-92 (explaining reasoning for finding coercion). 
 74.  See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 586-88 (1992) (highlighting state’s role in policy encouraging 
public school prayer). 
 75.  See id. at 587-88 (detailing principal’s major role in organizing prayer at graduation ceremony). 
 76.  See id. at 594-95 (addressing intrusion of religious exercise where skipping graduation not realistic 
option).  Kennedy began by stressing the heightened concerns that subtle coercive pressure creates in 
elementary and secondary schools.  Id. at 591-92.  He then stated that the government’s extensive involvement 
and control of the ceremony put substantial pressure on students to engage in actions that they themselves 
might understand as participation.  Id.  Although this pressure was indirect, because no one was required to 
stand or otherwise be involved, it was nevertheless real and substantial.  Id. at 593.  He also rejected the 
argument that there was no coercion because graduation ceremonies are not compulsory, noting the important 
role they play in society and determining they can hardly be considered voluntary in the normal sense of the 
word.  Id. at 595. 
 77.  See id. at 604 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“Although our precedents make clear that proof of 
government coercion is not necessary to prove an Establishment Clause violation, it is sufficient.”); id. at 619 
(Souter, J., concurring) (“[The Court’s precedents] simply cannot . . . support the position that a showing of 
coercion is necessary to a successful Establishment Clause claim.”). 
 78.  See Lee, 505 U.S. at 604 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (using language suggesting state actively 
participated in prayer).  Justice Blackmun stated:  “it is not enough that the government restrain from 
compelling religious practices:  [it] must not engage in them either.”  Id.  Justice Souter also emphasized the 
state’s active involvement when discussing endorsement concerns.  Id. at 629-30 (Souter, J., concurring) 
(“[T]he government’s sponsorship of prayer at the graduation ceremony is most reasonably understood as an 
official endorsement of religion….”). 
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message.79 
Thus, as in the earlier cases, the unconstitutionality of the prayer in Lee was 
predicated on the state’s substantial promotion of the religious activity.  This 
central concern was again affirmed in Santa Fe, the Court’s most recent school 
prayer decision.  In this case, the Court reviewed a school district policy that 
had students vote on whether to have prayer at home football games and, if so, 
to select the student who would deliver the prayer.80  The policy was an 
apparent effort to avoid the Supreme Court’s concerns about state-directed 
prayer in Lee by shifting the decision of whether to pray, and who would pray, 
over to the students.  Nevertheless, the Court held the policy unconstitutional, 
finding it suffered from the same defects as found in Lee.81  First, despite 
letting students vote on whether to pray, the Court explained that the policy as a 
whole clearly promoted school prayer with the State’s imprint on it.82  Second, 
the state-promoted prayer resulted in coercion of those attending football games 
and was therefore unconstitutional.83 
These five decisions striking down various state-promoted prayer in public 
schools demonstrate the Court’s continuing vigilance in monitoring religious 
exercise in public schools.  Each of the decisions, however, turned on the 
state’s own involvement in promoting the prayer in question, and not prayer as 
such.84  Indeed, in these decisions the Court was careful to affirm the right of 
students to pray on their own on school property, which is permitted and at 
times even protected.85  For example, in Santa Fe, the Court noted a crucial 
distinction between voluntary student prayer and state-sponsored prayer.86  
While the latter is prohibited by the Establishment Clause, the former is 
 
 79.  Id. at 630 n.8 (Souter, J., concurring) (describing example of delivery of religious message difficult to 
attribute to state endorsement). 
 80.  See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 US. 290, 297 (2000) (describing voting process for 
selecting students to deliver prayer). 
 81.  See id. at 302 (holding prayer in Santa Fe unconstitutional).  The Court began its analysis by stating 
that “our analysis is properly guided by the principles that we endorsed in Lee.”  Id.  The next two sections of 
the Court’s analysis closely tracked the two-part coercion test established in Lee.  See id. at 302-10. 
 82.  See id. at 306-09 (holding practice promotes prayer). 
 83.  See id. at 309-12 (determining coercion). 
 84.  See supra notes 35-83 and accompanying text (discussing school prayer cases). 
 85.  See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 302; Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990) (plurality 
opinion). 
 86.  See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 302 (2000) (quoting Mergens, 496 U.S. at 250 
(O’Connor, J., plurality)) (distinguishing voluntary student prayer and state-sponsored prayer).  The Santa Fe 
Court agreed with the Mergens plurality statement that “there is a crucial difference between government 
speech endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, 
which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect.”  Id. at 302 (quoting Mergens, 496 U.S. at 250).  At 
the end of its coercion analysis, the Court in Santa Fe again stressed this fundamental distinction, stating:  
“Thus, nothing in the Constitution as interpreted by this Court prohibits any public school student from 
voluntarily praying at any time before, during, or after the schoolday [sic].  But the religious liberty protected 
by the Constitution is abridged when the State affirmatively sponsors the particular religious practice of 
prayer.”  Id. at 313. 
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permitted and often protected under the Free Speech Clause.87  This distinction 
is central to the limited public forum cases in the following section involving 
religious speech. 
As the next section will show, the analysis is much different when schools 
create a public forum for private speech.  Unlike the school prayer cases, here 
the religious expression comes from private, rather than government sources.  
Not only has the Court consistently held that it violates free speech to exclude 
religious speech from such fora, but that inclusion of religious speech on a 
neutral basis equal to other speech content is permitted under the Establishment 
Clause.88 
C.  The Public Forum Cases 
In a series of five cases stretching back three decades, the Supreme Court 
has addressed the issue of religion, including worship-like activities, in the 
context of a school-created public forum.89  All five cases share the same basic 
fact pattern.  Each involved a public school, ranging from an elementary school 
to a four-year university.  In each case, the school decided to create what could 
be viewed as a forum for speech purposes.  In three of the cases, the forum was 
only for the students, while in the two other cases, the forum was for 
community groups similar to those in the Bronx Household litigation.  In each 
case, however, the school denied access to religious speech because of 
perceived Establishment Clause problems.  In all five cases, the Supreme Court 
said that denying access to a group because of the religious content of its 
speech violated the Free Speech Clause, and granting equal access to religious 
speech eliminated any Establishment Clause problems that might otherwise 
exist. 
In the first of these cases, Widmar v. Vincent, the Court held that a public 
university could not prohibit a religious student group that wanted to use space 
on campus for prayer and worship-like activities from using campus facilities 
when the use of such facilities was extended to nonreligious student groups.90  
The Court specifically recognized prayer and worship as forms of speech 
protected by the First Amendment, stating that the university “has 
discriminated against student groups and speakers based on their desire to use a 
generally open forum to engage in religious worship and discussion.  These are 
 
 87.  See id. at 302. 
 88.  See infra Part I.C (discussing public forum cases). 
 89.  See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 120 (2001); Rosenberger v. Rector & 
Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 831-46 (1995); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 
508 U.S. 384, 393-95 (1993); Mergens, 496 U.S. at 253; Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 273 (1981).  For a 
discussion of these cases and how they relate to the issue of worship in public places, especially with regard to 
the free speech issue, see Esenberg, supra note 18, at 460-73; Burnidge, supra note 18, at 1331-34. 
 90.  454 U.S. at 277. 
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forms of speech and association protected by the First Amendment.”91  Their 
exclusion, therefore, violated the Free Speech Clause.  The Court also rejected 
the argument that the Establishment Clause prohibited the use of campus 
facilities by religious groups, noting that permitting equal access to such groups 
did not confer the state’s imprimatur.92  Thus, as long as the forum had a 
secular purpose, providing equal access to religious groups did not violate the 
Establishment Clause; in fact, the Free Speech Clause mandated such access.93 
In the next case, Board of Education v. Mergens, a high school permitted 
about thirty student clubs to meet on campus, but denied permission to a Bible 
study club because school officials believed recognizing a religious group 
would violate the Establishment Clause.94  The students sued under the Equal 
Access Act, a federal statute that in effect extended the protections of Widmar 
to high school campuses.95  The Act states that once a school creates a forum 
for student clubs, it cannot exclude a group because of its content.96  The 
Supreme Court held for the students, finding that exclusion of the Bible study 
club violated the Equal Access Act, and that permitting the group to meet as 
part of a broader forum of student groups did not violate the Establishment 
Clause.97 
The Court analyzed the students’ speech rights under the Equal Access Act, 
such that the majority did not directly address constitutional free speech 
rights.98  As a practical matter, however, the case had strong constitutional 
overtones, in part because the clear purpose of the Act was to extend to high 
school students the same rights the Court recognized for college students in 
Widmar.99  Justice Marshall made this point in a concurring opinion, stating 
that the Equal Access Act simply codified what was already constitutionally 
required under the Free Speech Clause.100  Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion 
also strongly hinted at the free speech overtones of the case.101 
 
 91.  Id. at 269. 
 92.  See id. at 274.  The Court also noted that since over 100 student groups participated in the 
university’s open forum, the forum’s primary effect was not to advance religion absent a showing that religious 
groups would dominate the forum.  Id. at 274-75. 
 93.  See id. at 278 (allowing religious student group to convene on school property). 
 94.  See 496 U.S. 226, 231-33 (1990) (reviewing facts relevant to issue). 
 95.  See id. at 231 (discussing determination of whether school act violates Equal Access Act); see also 20 
U.S.C. § 4071(a)-(b) (2012). 
 96.  20 U.S.C. § 4071(a) (prohibiting discrimination against speech because of religious, political, or 
philosophical content). 
 97.  See Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 234 (1990) (affirming decision of Court of Appeals). 
 98.  See id. at 235-36. 
 99.  See id. 
 100.  See id. at 262 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 101.  See Mergens, 496 U.S. at 250 (plurality opinion) (commenting on Establishment, Free Speech and 
Free Exercise clauses).  “[T]here is a crucial difference between government speech endorsing religion, which 
the Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and Free 
Exercise Clauses protect.”  Id. 
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In regard to the second issue, whether granting equal access to a Bible study 
club in a public school violated the Establishment Clause, the Court made clear 
what was suggested in Widmar:  the neutral treatment of religion in a public 
forum, including public schools, does not violate the Establishment Clause.102  
No single opinion commanded a majority of the Court on this issue, but a focus 
on neutral treatment of religion satisfying the Establishment Clause ran through 
the various opinions.103  Justice O’Connor’s four-member plurality opinion 
stressed that the basic message of the Act was “one of neutrality rather than 
endorsement; if a State refused to let religious groups use facilities open to 
others, then it would demonstrate not neutrality but hostility toward 
religion.”104  Justices Scalia and Kennedy, though not applying Justice 
O’Connor’s endorsement analysis, nevertheless agreed that the neutral 
treatment of religion, in which religious speech is treated the same as other 
speech, satisfies the Establishment Clause.105  Taken as a whole, Mergens 
confirmed and sharpened the Widmar analysis:  religious speech must be 
provided equal access to speech forums, and such neutral treatment of religion 
does not violate the Establishment Clause.106 
The Court applied the same analysis three years later in Lamb’s Chapel v. 
Center Moriches Union Free School District.  There, the Court again held that 
excluding religious speech from a limited public forum violated the Free 
Speech Clause, and granting access to the forum did not violate the 
Establishment Clause.107  In this case, a school district policy permitted use of 
school facilities for various community groups, but specifically excluded 
religious use on the grounds that it would violate the Establishment Clause.108  
A church requested to use a school building to show a film series on child-
rearing, which would have been a permissible use of the building except for the 
religious perspective on the subject.109  For that reason, the school denied the 
request and the church sued.110  As it had in the earlier cases, the Court held 
that excluding the church from a school-created speech forum violated the Free 
Speech Clause, and granting access to the church on equal grounds to other 
groups did not violate the Establishment Clause.111 
 
 102.  See id. at 253 (finding no violation of Establishment Clause). 
 103.  See Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 248, 251 (1990); id. at 260-66 (Kennedy, J., concurring); 
id. at 264, 266, 270 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 104.  Id. at 248 (plurality opinion). 
 105.  See id. at 260 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 106.  See generally id. (requiring equal access for religious speech and holding practice does not violate 
Establishment Clause). 
 107.  See Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394-95 (1993) (describing 
holding permitted church group access under given circumstances). 
 108.  See id. at 387, 395 (explaining school district practice). 
 109.  See id. at 387. 
 110.  See id. at 386-89 (describing events leading to suit). 
 111.  See Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 395 (holding violation of Free Speech Clause and no violation of 
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The Court began its analysis with the free speech issue, assuming without 
deciding that the school’s policy only created a limited public forum, which 
requires viewpoint but not subject-matter neutrality.112  Even with this 
assumption about the policy, the Court said the school district’s exclusion of 
the church constituted viewpoint discrimination and was unconstitutional.113  
The Court noted that the school policy permitted use of their facilities to show 
films or give talks on child-rearing in general, and therefore the policy only 
prohibited religious viewpoints on the subject.114  The fact that the policy 
prohibited all religious viewpoints on the topic did not make it any less 
egregious.  The Court also noted that, like in Widmar and Mergens, permitting 
the church to use school facilities on the same terms as other groups did not 
violate the Establishment Clause.115  As it had in Widmar, the Court stated that 
under the circumstances of the case there was “no realistic danger that the 
community would think that the District was endorsing religion or any [other] 
particular creed, and any benefit to religion or to the Church would have been 
no more than incidental.”116 
In the final two cases, Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of University of 
Virginia and Good News Club v. Milford Central School, the Court again 
addressed the exclusion of religious speech from a state-created forum in what 
might be viewed as particularly sensitive Establishment Clause contexts.  In 
Rosenberger, the University of Virginia provided funding for certain student 
publications, but specifically prohibited funding for religious groups, stating 
that direct financial support for religion violated the Establishment Clause.117  
The Court found the exclusion of religious speech unconstitutional, as the 
university violated the public forum requirement that permits only content-
neutral restrictions.118  Indeed, as in Lamb’s Chapel, the Court characterized the 
denial of funds as viewpoint discrimination, since it precluded the religious 
perspective on a number of topics that student publications might discuss.119  
 
Establishment Clause). 
 112.  See id. at 391-93.  The Court stated that the church’s argument that the school district had created a 
designated public forum “ha[d] considerable force” because of the wide variety of groups that used the school 
facilities.  Id. at 391.  This would have precluded even subject-matter restrictions unless they were “justified by 
a compelling state interest and [were] narrowly drawn.”  Id.  The Court declined to decide that issue, however, 
since the school district policy failed even the less rigorous standard for limited public fora.  See id. at 391-93. 
 113.  See Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394 (1993) (disallowing 
prohibition on church screening child-rearing video). 
 114.  See id. at 393-94 (holding district engaged in viewpoint discrimination). 
 115.  See id. (holding Establishment Clause not violated). 
 116.  Id. at 395. 
 117.  See 515 U.S. 819, 824-25 (1995) (explaining university guidelines for publication). 
 118.  See id. at 830 (holding publications created public forum where only content-neutral restrictions 
appropriate). 
 119.  See id. at 831-32 (discussing viewpoint discrimination).  The Court stated 
 
We conclude, nonetheless, that here, as in Lamb’s Chapel, viewpoint discrimination is the proper 
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As such, the policy violated the Free Speech Clause.120 
After concluding that denying funding violated free speech, the Court 
addressed whether funding religious publications on the same basis as other 
groups violated the Establishment Clause.  Unlike the prior cases, which 
involved access to school facilities, the Establishment Clause issue in 
Rosenberger—funding for a blatantly religious message—created distinct 
issues.121  As emphasized by the dissent, financial support of religion was one 
of the principal concerns giving rise to the Establishment Clause.122  Despite 
that concern, the Court once again held that providing funding to religious 
publications would not violate the Establishment Clause, once again stressing 
the neutrality of such a scheme.123  The Court began its discussion by stating, 
“[a] central lesson of our decisions is that a significant factor in upholding 
governmental programs in the face of Establishment Clause attack is their 
neutrality towards religion.”124  On this basis the Court held that including 
religious publications in the funding program would be constitutional, since it 
would simply be treating religion neutrally, not preferentially.125 
The final and most recent case involving the exclusion of religious speech 
from a school-created public forum is Good News Club v. Milford Central 
School.  In this case, a school district adopted rules permitting schools to open 
their facilities to various community groups, similar to Lamb’s Chapel.126  
Pursuant to the policy, a local “Good News Club,” a Christian organization for 
 
way to interpret the University’s objections to Wide Awake.  By the very terms of the SAF 
prohibition, the University does not exclude religion as a subject matter but selects for disfavored 
treatment those student journalistic efforts with religious editorial viewpoints.  Religion may be a 
vast area of inquiry, but it also provides, as it did here, a specific premise, a perspective, a standpoint 
from which a variety of subjects may be discussed and considered.  The prohibited perspective, not 
the general subject matter, resulted in the refusal to make third-party payments, for the subjects 
discussed were otherwise within the approved category of publications. 
 
Id. at 831. 
 120.  See id. at 820 (holding guideline obstructs Free Speech Clause). 
 121.  See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 868 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 122.  See id.  “Using public funds for the direct subsidization of preaching the word is categorically 
forbidden under the Establishment Clause, and if the Clause was meant to accomplish nothing else, it was 
meant to bar this use of public money.”  Id. 
 123.  See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 840 (1995). 
 124.  Id. at 839. 
 125.  See id. at 840 (explaining program as neutral towards religion).  The Court also stated that the 
program’s neutrality helped distinguish it from the Founders’ concerns about taxes to support churches.  
Whereas the Founders wanted to prevent taxes imposed “for the sole and exclusive purpose of establishing and 
supporting specific sects,” the program at issue involved student fees that supported a broad range of ideas and 
thought, only some of which might potentially be religious.  See id. at 840-41 (distinguishing student fee 
programs from taxes levied solely for religious purposes). 
 126.  Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 102-03 (2001) (explaining criteria for building 
use).  School district regulations identified several purposes for which local schools could be open to public 
use, including “instruction in any branch of education, learning or the arts,” and for “social, civic and 
recreational meetings and entertainment events.”  Id. at 102. 
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young children, sought permission to use an elementary school building after 
school for meetings.127  A typical meeting would include learning and reciting 
Bible verses, singing songs (presumably Christian), hearing a Bible story, and 
closing with a prayer.128  Although the school policy permitted other groups, 
such as the Boy Scouts, to use the building, the school refused permission for 
the Good News Club to meet because of the religious nature of the meetings.129 
As in the previous cases, the Supreme Court held that excluding the religious 
group from a school-created forum violated the Free Speech Clause, and 
permitting the group to use the building on the same terms as other groups 
would not violate the Establishment Clause.130  The Court began its free speech 
analysis by recognizing that the school had created a limited public forum, 
which required that speech restrictions be viewpoint neutral and reasonable.131  
Relying on its previous analysis in Lamb’s Chapel and Rosenberger, the Court 
concluded that excluding religious groups from the forum constituted 
unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.132  The Court stated that under the 
school-use guidelines it was clear that any group that “promote[s] the moral 
and character development of children,” such as the Boy Scouts, was permitted 
to use school facilities.133  Since the Good News Club was seeking to address a 
subject permitted under these guidelines from a religious perspective, the Court 
deemed its exclusion unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.134 
The Court then addressed the Establishment Clause issue and concluded, as 
it had in previous cases, that permitting the Good News Club to meet on the 
same terms as other groups would not violate the Establishment Clause.135  As 
in previous cases such as Lamb’s Chapel and Widmar, the Court emphasized 
the importance of neutrality in analyzing Establishment Clause issues, and that 
permitting the Club to meet on school property “would ensure neutrality, not 
threaten it.”136 
These five limited public fora decisions—Widmar, Mergens, Lamb’s 
Chapel, Rosenberger, and Good News Club—reflect two basic principles.  
First, excluding religious viewpoints from a school-created public forum 
violates the Free Speech Clause.  The Court consistently characterized the 
exclusion of religious speech as viewpoint discrimination, because such 
exclusion prohibits religious perspectives on various topics otherwise 
 
 127.  See id. at 103. 
 128.  See id. 
 129.  See id. at 103-04, 108. 
 130.  See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 102. 
 131.  See id. at 106-07 (describing Court’s analysis of limits on state power to restrict speech). 
 132.  See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 107 (2001) (explaining court analysis for 
attempted exclusion). 
 133.  Id. at 108 (alteration in original). 
 134.  See id. at 111-12. 
 135.  See id. at 114 (holding no violation of Establishment Clause in permitting religious group meeting). 
 136.  Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 114. 
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discussed.  This characterization is quite important, as these decisions 
transformed potentially acceptable subject matter restrictions (religion), into 
unconstitutional viewpoint restrictions. 
Second, in all five cases the Court held that allowing religious speech in a 
school-created forum does not violate the Establishment Clause.137  In doing so, 
it largely, though not completely, applied a neutrality analysis, stating that the 
neutral treatment of religion mitigated any Establishment Clause concerns.  
Indeed, these five cases reflect symmetry of sorts, as the same neutrality 
required by the Free Speech Clause suffices for any concerns under the 
Establishment Clause.  As part of this, the Court also suggested that the neutral 
treatment of religion mitigated any potential perception of state endorsement of 
religion. 
The next section of the article will examine the Second Circuit’s 2011 
decision, designated Bronx Household IV, upholding a school board’s policy 
prohibiting use of public schools for religious worship.138  This decision stated 
that the exclusion of religious worship from the board-created speech forum did 
not violate the Free Speech Clause, and that there was a “strong basis” for the 
school board to believe that inclusion of religious worship would violate the 
Establishment Clause. 
II.  BRONX HOUSEHOLD IV 
A.  Facts and Procedural History 
The Bronx Household litigation began in 1994 when Bronx Household, a 
Christian church, and its pastors, applied to use space in a public middle school 
in the Bronx for church services on Sunday mornings.139  New York state law 
permits public school districts to make their facilities available to outside 
community groups for “social, civic, and recreational meetings and 
entertainments” as long as the uses are open to the general public.140  Pursuant 
to that law, the New York City Board of Education (Board) developed a forum 
policy governing after-hours use of school facilities.141  Although the policy 
permitted meetings to discuss “religious material or material which contains a 
religious viewpoint,” it specifically prohibited outside groups from 
“conduct[ing] religious services or religious instruction on school premises 
after school.”142 
Bronx Household’s application described its services as including “‘singing 
 
 137.  See supra notes 89-134 and accompanying text. 
 138.  See infra Part II (analyzing Bronx Household decisions). 
 139.  Bronx Household IV, 650 F.3d 30, 32-33 (2d. Cir. 2011) (describing origins of suit). 
 140.  Id. at 33. 
 141.  See id. (discussing New York state law regarding after-hours school use). 
 142.  Id. at 33 n.2. 
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of Christian hymns and songs, prayer, fellowship with other church members 
and Biblical preaching and teaching, communion, [and] sharing of testimonies,’ 
followed by a ‘fellowship meal.’”143  The Board denied the application because 
it fell within the prohibition of religious services.144  The church then sued, 
arguing that the denial of its application was unconstitutional viewpoint 
discrimination.145 
The Board initially prevailed before both the district court and the Second 
Circuit, as both courts held that exclusion of religious worship and instruction 
did not violate the church’s free speech rights.146  After the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Good News Club, however, the church reapplied for permission to 
use the school, and once more, the school denied the church’s request.147  When 
the church sued again, the district court granted a preliminary injunction, citing 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Good News Club.148  As a result, the Second 
Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction.149 
While cross-motions for summary judgment on a permanent injunction were 
pending, the Board informed the district court that it had revised its policy and 
requested that the court decide the motions under the new policy.150  Though 
quite similar to the initial policy, the new text prohibited use of school property 
for “religious worship services, or otherwise . . . as a house of worship,” but no 
longer prohibited use for “religious instruction.”151  Even though the Board had 
not yet applied the new policy to the church, the district court found the issue 
justiciable—as the most recent application denial was under the old policy—
held for the church, and granted a permanent injunction.152  A divided Second 
Circuit decision remanded the case back to the district court.153 
 
 143.  Bronx Household IV, 650 F.3d at 33 (alteration in original). 
 144.  See id. 
 145.  See Bronx Household IV, 650 F.3d 30, 33 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 146.  See Bronx Household of Faith v. Cmty. Sch. Dist. No. 10, No. 95 Civ. 5501 (LAP), 1996 WL 700915 
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 1996), aff’d, 127 F.3d 207 (2d Cir. 1997); Bronx Household of Faith v. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 127 
F.3d 207, 216 (2d Cir. 1997) (Bronx Household I) (holding church’s free exercise rights not violated or 
infringed by religious exclusions). 
 147.  See Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ. (Bronx Household I.A), 226 F. Supp. 2d 401, 409-11 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d, 331 F.3d 342 (2d Cir. 2003); see also Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 
98 (2001). 
 148.  See Bronx Household I.A, 226 F. Supp. 2d at 427. 
 149.  See Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ. (Bronx Household II), 331 F.3d 342, 346 (2d Cir. 
2003). 
 150.  See Bronx Household IV, 650 F.3d 30, 34 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 151.  Id. at 34-35, n.4. 
 152.  See Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 400 F. Supp. 2d 581, 588, 601 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), 
vacated per curiam, 492 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 153.  See Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 492 F.3d 89, 91 (2d Cir. 2007) (Bronx Household III) 
(per curiam).  The Second Circuit panel was deeply divided.  Id.  Two of the judges agreed with the district 
court and believed that the issue was justiciable notwithstanding the church’s application under the old policy, 
but disagreed on whether denial of the church’s application violated the First Amendment.  See id. at 92-106 
(Calabresi, J., concurring) (stating exclusion policy qualifies as viewpoint neutral and therefore constitutional); 
id. at 123-32 (Walker, J., dissenting) (stating exclusion policy constituted unconstitutional viewpoint 
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Under the new policy, the church once again applied for a permit, which the 
Board denied.154  The district court again granted summary judgment in favor 
of the church, permanently enjoining enforcement of the Board policy 
prohibiting religious worship services on public school policy.155  The case then 
went before the Second Circuit for a decision on the merits in light of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Good News Club. 
B.  Court’s Analysis 
The Second Circuit began its discussion of the free speech issue by stating 
that the Board’s policy permitting use of school facilities created a limited 
public forum.156  As such, any restrictions on speech must be viewpoint neutral 
and reasonable.  At the same time, however, the state may engage in subject-
matter restrictions.157 
The court noted that the policy in question prohibited two types of activities:  
“religious worship services” and “otherwise using a school as a house of 
worship.”158  Although the Board did not specify which of the two was the 
basis of its rejection, the court assumed that it was based on the first—
“religious worship services”—because the church’s application said it would 
use the school for “Christian worship services.”159  Therefore, the court limited 
its analysis to the validity of the first prohibition against “religious worship 
services” as applied to the Bronx Household.  The court expressly declined to 
address the validity of the “house of worship” provision.160  The court 
expressly explained that it was not deciding whether a school could lawfully 
exclude “worship” on its property.161 
The court then proceeded to the heart of its free speech analysis, 
characterizing the prohibition on using school facilities for “religious worship 
services” as a ban on a type of activity or event, not as a restriction on any 
view.  The court stated: 
 
 
discrimination).  The third judge said the issue was not yet ripe for adjudication because the Board denied the 
church’s application under the old, not the current policy.  See id. at 106-23 (Leval, J., concurring).  Therefore, 
in a short per curiam opinion, the court vacated the permanent injunction and “remand[ed] the action to the 
district court for all purposes.”  Id. at 91 (per curiam). 
 154.  See Bronx Household IV, 650 F.3d at 34-35 (discussing procedural history). 
 155.  See Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., No. 01 Civ. 8598 LAP, 2007 WL 7946842 (S.D.N.Y. 
Nov. 2, 2007), rev’d, 650 F.3d 30 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 156.  Bronx Household IV, 650 F.3d at 36. 
 157.  See id.  The Supreme Court has held that speech restrictions in a limited public forum must be 
viewpoint neutral and reasonable.  See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106-07 (2001); 
Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 392-93 (1993). 
 158.  Bronx Household of Faith IV, 650 F.3d at 34-35. 
 159.  Id. at 36. 
 160.  Id. 
 161.  Bronx Household IV, 650 F.3d 30, 36 n.6 (2d Cir. 2011). 
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The conduct of services is the performance of an event or activity.  While the 
conduct of religious services undoubtedly includes expressions of a religious 
point of view, it is not the expression of that point of view that is prohibited by 
the rule.  Prayer, religious instruction, expression of devotion to God, and the 
singing of hymns, whether done by a person or a group, do not constitute the 
conduct of worship services.  Those activities are not excluded.162 
 
Thus, according to the court, the first prong of the policy banned the event of 
“religious worship service” and not necessarily any of the components (singing, 
prayer, preaching, etc.) that typically makes up a worship service.163  The court 
further stated that the “religious worship services” clause did not even prohibit 
“worship”—a separate issue the court was not addressing.164  Rather, the 
“religious worship services” clause only banned a particular type of event, 
which the courts described as “a collective activity characteristically done 
according to an order prescribed by and under the auspices of an organized 
religion, typically but not necessarily conducted by an ordained official of the 
religion.”165 
The court then drew a distinction “between excluding the conduct of an 
event or activity that includes expression of a point of view, and excluding the 
expression of that point of view.”166  As an example, the court explained that 
events “such as martial arts matches, livestock shows, and horseback riding” 
could be excluded from the forum, even though participants and spectators, in 
participating in and viewing the events, express their love of the activity.167  
The court reasoned that a worship service, also an event, can be excluded 
notwithstanding the viewpoints included as long as individuals can still express 
those viewpoints in some other capacity. 
As a result, the majority concluded that the prohibition on the event of a 
“religious worship service” was viewpoint neutral, because people can still 
express the views included in the service in some other capacity in the 
forum.168  The court reiterated that the individual components of a service, such 
as prayer, singing, and preaching were themselves not banned by the clause 
under review.  Thus, all views could still be expressed.169 
After determining that the prohibition on religious worship services was 
viewpoint neutral, the court then proceeded to analyze whether the restriction 
was “reasonable,”—the other requirement for valid restrictions on speech in a 
 
 162.  Id. at 36. 
 163.  Id. at 38. 
 164.  Id. at 36-38. 
 165.  Bronx Household IV, 650 F.3d at 37. 
 166.  Id. at 37. 
 167.  Bronx Household IV, 650 F.3d 30, 37-38 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 168.  See id. at 36-37 (allowing expressions seen in worship services but not worship event). 
 169.  See id. at 37. 
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limited public forum.170  In particular, the court examined whether the Board’s 
asserted rationale—excluding religious worship services to avoid an 
Establishment Clause violation—was reasonable.171  The court made clear that 
it was not deciding whether allowing religious worship services on school 
property as part of a limited forum would in fact violate the Establishment 
Clause, only if it were reasonable to believe it would.172  Thus, the issue was 
whether there was a “strong basis for concern” that allowing religious worship 
services on public school property would violate the Establishment Clause.173 
The court concluded that such a strong basis existed.  The court began by 
setting out the three-prong Lemon test, which requires that government action 
must have a secular purpose, a “principal or primary effect” that neither 
advances nor inhibits religion, and does not create an excessive entanglement 
with religion.174  In applying this test, the court identified several different 
concerns.  For example, it noted that by not charging rent for use of school 
facilities, which was the policy for any group, the state substantially subsidized 
religious worship.175  The court stated that it was reasonable to see this as 
“‘foster[ing] an excessive government entanglement with religion’ that 
advances religion.”176 
However, the court’s dominant concern regarding a possible Establishment 
Clause violation was the potential perception of government endorsement of 
religion posed by permitting worship services on public school property.177  In 
this regard, the court noted three concerns.  First, Christian worship services 
tended to dominate use of school space on Sunday mornings, and this created 
the perception that the school not only endorsed religion, but specifically 
endorsed Christianity.178  Second, the court noted that church members post 
signs and distribute flyers outside the schools, leading members of both the 
community and the congregation to identify the church with the school.179  
Third, the court expressed particular concern with the fact that “young and 
 
 170.  See id. at 40. 
 171.  See Bronx Household IV, 650 F.3d at 40. 
 172.  See id. 
 173.  Bronx Household IV, 650 F.3d 30, 40 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 174.  Id.; see Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-613 (1971) (establishing “Lemon” test).  The Lemon 
test dominated Supreme Court Establishment Clause analysis for a number of years, but its influence has 
substantially waned over the past quarter century.  See Ira C. Lupu, To Control Faction and Protect Liberty:  A 
General Theory of the Religion Clause, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 357, 365 (1996); Michael Stokes Paulsen, 
Lemon is Dead, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 795, 797 (1993).  Lower courts, however, continue to apply the 
Lemon test on a regular basis, since it has yet to be overruled. 
 175.  See Bronx Household IV, 650 F.3d at 41. 
 176.  Id. (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612). 
 177.  See id. at 42.  The court highlighted the endorsement concern at both the beginning and end of its 
Establishment Clause analysis.  See id. at 40, 44.  The court devoted the majority of its discussion to the 
problem of endorsement.  See id. at 40-44. 
 178.  See Bronx Household IV, 650 F.3d at 42. 
 179.  Bronx Household IV, 650 F.3d 30, 42 (2d Cir. 2011). 
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impressionable students” who attend the schools that the church used for 
worship on Sundays might perceive government endorsement of the worship 
services.180 
Judge Walker filed a strong dissent, arguing that under Supreme Court 
precedent the exclusion policy constituted unconstitutional viewpoint 
discrimination.  Further, he argued that permitting worship services as part of a 
broader forum in which school facilities were available to various community 
groups did not violate the Establishment Clause.181  Nonetheless, the majority 
held that the exclusion was viewpoint neutral and thus constitutional, asserting 
that permitting worship services would raise serious Establishment Clause 
concerns.  As suggested by the dissent, this goes against the grain of the five 
Supreme Court decisions involving attempts to exclude religion from school-
created forums.  The next two parts of the article will examine those issues in-
depth.  Part III will examine whether excluding worship services from an 
otherwise broad community forum violates free speech, and Part IV will 
examine whether inclusion of worship services in such a forum violates the 
Establishment Clause. 
III.  FREE SPEECH, WORSHIP, AND THE LIMITED PUBLIC FORUM 
Schools, of course, are not a traditional public forum, and therefore religious 
groups and others do not have a right per se to use them.182  The Supreme Court 
has noted, however, that even if the state is not obligated to open up its 
facilities for speech, once it does so, it has to make them available on a content-
neutral basis.183  Although the Court has not always drawn clear distinctions, it 
appears that the state might create two types of fora:  a designated public 
forum, in which government property is indiscriminately open to a wide variety 
of speech and is treated like a traditional public forum, or a limited public 
forum.184 
Where school districts open their facilities to various community groups, as 
occurred in the Bronx Household litigation, such policies are best viewed as 
creating limited public forums.  While the court examines each case on the 
specific nature of the policy, school policies typically open school facilities to 
the community for limited purposes and do not create a more general free 
speech forum.  Moreover, the Supreme Court has tended to view such policies 
 
 180.  Id. 
 181.  See id. at 52-64 (Walker, J., dissenting). 
 182.  See Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 390-391 (1993). 
 183.  See id.; Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267-68 (1981). 
 184.  See Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 391-93.  In Lamb’s Chapel, the Court stated that the school district’s 
community-use policy was expansive enough that it might have created a “designated public forum,” in which 
case even subject-matter restrictions would be prohibited.  See id.  The Court declined to decide the issue, 
however, since the policy failed even the less rigorous standard for limited public fora.  See id. at 391-92. 
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involving schools as establishing limited public forums.185 
Restrictions on speech in a limited public forum must meet two requirements 
to be valid.  First, the restrictions must be viewpoint neutral, but not necessarily 
subject-matter neutral.186  Thus, speech can be limited to certain topics, but 
restrictions must be viewpoint neutral regarding those topics.187  Second, the 
restrictions must be “reasonable.”188  As a practical matter, most limited public 
forum cases turn on whether or not the restriction is viewpoint neutral, and pay 
less attention to the reasonableness requirement.189 
As noted in Part I, in limited public forum cases, the Court has been quick to 
characterize speech restrictions as viewpoint based.190  Though not addressing 
the issue in Widmar or Mergens, the Court found the restrictions in Lamb’s 
Chapel, Rosenberger, and Good News Club to be unconstitutional viewpoint 
restrictions.191  In each case, the Court said that the schools created a forum for 
speech that implicitly included certain topics, but that the schools 
unconstitutionally excluded religious perspectives on those topics.  For 
example, in Lamb’s Chapel the Court noted that a community group could use 
school space to discuss child-rearing, but could not present the religious 
perspective on the same topic.192  Similarly, in Rosenberger, nonreligious 
publications could address topics such as racism and the environment, but 
precluded religious viewpoints on those issues.193  Finally, in Good News Club 
the Court said groups like the Boy Scouts could teach values, but banned 
religious perspectives on the same topic.194 
Based on these cases, it would clearly be viewpoint discrimination if a 
church were denied use of school space for worship pursuant to a school policy 
prohibiting religious use in general.  Such a situation would suffer the same 
infirmity as in the above cases:  religious views, whether communicated in the 
context of worship or otherwise, would be precluded.  Thus, prohibition of 
worship services pursuant to a broad prohibition of religious activities in 
general, as found in the broad policies in Lamb’s Chapel, Rosenberger, and 
 
 185.  See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 99 (2001); Rosenberger v. Rector & 
Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995). 
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 194.  See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 107-08. 
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Good News Club, would constitute viewpoint discrimination. 
Admittedly, however, the type of policy in Bronx Household, which 
essentially prohibited only worship, rather than religious uses in general, is not 
as obviously viewpoint-based.  As emphasized by the majority opinion in 
Bronx Household IV, unlike the policies in previous cases, the policy at issue 
did not prohibit use of school facilities by religious groups or for religious 
purposes, which clearly would have been unconstitutional.195  According to the 
majority, school facilities were open for use to discuss religious views on any 
topic and of any type; none were precluded.196 
Moreover, the majority went a step further and said that the first clause in 
the policy banning “worship services,” the only prohibition the court 
interpreted, applied only to worship services themselves, and not to their 
various components.  Indeed, the crux of the majority opinion was that the 
policy only prohibited an activity, worship services, and did not regulate 
speech.  The majority stated that school policy would permit the various 
components typically found in many Christian worship services, such as prayer, 
singing, and religious instruction.197  The majority stated that “[t]here is an 
important difference between excluding the conduct of an event or activity that 
includes expression of a point of view, and excluding the expression of that 
point of view.”198  It then proceeded to give examples of events that could be 
excluded from a limited public forum in schools, “such as martial arts matches, 
livestock shows, and horseback riding, even though, by participating in and 
viewing such events, participants and spectators may express their love of 
them.”199  The court reasoned that the same applied to worship services, which 
could be precluded in the same way other events could be.200 
Notwithstanding the majority’s analysis, restrictions on religious worship 
services are best viewed as viewpoint-based and thus, unconstitutional.  To 
begin with, the majority’s distinction between a worship service, which is 
merely an event or activity, and the various elements of such a service, such as 
preaching, prayer, and singing, is highly problematic for several reasons.201  
First, the majority failed to give any meaningful explanation for this distinction, 
merely noting that Bronx Household had used the term religious worship 
service in its application.  But the church’s application also described the 
service as including “singing of Christian hymns and songs, prayer, fellowship 
with other church members and Biblical preaching and teaching, communion, 
 
 195.  See Bronx Household IV, 650 F.3d 30, 39-40 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 196.  See id. at 37-38. 
 197.  See id. at 36. 
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[and] sharing of testimonies.”202  Arguably, if the church, instead of applying to 
use the school for a religious worship service, had instead simply applied to use 
the school for the activities listed above, the school would have approved its 
application.  Free speech rights should not turn on such fine, and in the end, 
meaningless distinctions.203 
Second, the majority’s distinction between events and activities from 
expression is problematic, especially as applied to expressive activities.  The 
analogy the majority uses to “martial arts matches, livestock shows, and 
horseback riding” fails to work, because, unlike worship services, those 
activities are not inherently expressive.204  True, as the majority notes, there is 
an element of expression in those activities, if nothing else than to 
communicate that people enjoy “participating in [or] viewing such events.”205  
That proves too much, however, because all conduct communicates something.  
As such, the Supreme Court has drawn a distinction between expressive 
conduct—conduct that is characterized by its expressive purpose and 
features—and other conduct; only the former qualifies for First Amendment 
protection.206 
The more appropriate analogy, therefore, would be expressive events, such 
as rallies, debates, and parades.  Each of these is an event, in the same way that 
a religious worship service is an event, but each certainly qualifies for free 
speech protection.  For example, if a group applied to use the school for a 
“Save the Whales” rally and was denied, it is hard to imagine that a court 
would treat the rally as a mere activity.  To deny the rally is to deny what 
would be said at the rally; the two cannot be separated on the basis that one is 
merely conduct of an event or activity, and the other is speech.  Such is the case 
with expressive, as opposed to non-expressive, activities. 
The same is true of a religious worship service.  Worship does not become 
an event merely because the word “service” is tacked on.  Rather, it is an 
inherently expressive activity, as the Supreme Court recognized in Widmar.207  
 
 202.  Id. at 33. 
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To be sure, worship is not merely an expressive activity, nor is it simply the 
sum total of its expressive components, such as prayer, singing, preaching, and 
teaching.  As Judge Calabresi correctly noted in his concurrence in Bronx 
Household IV, to characterize worship as “only an agglomeration of rites would 
be a judicial finding on the nature of worship that would not only be grievously 
wrong, but also deeply insulting to persons of faith.”208 
But to recognize that worship is more than assorted expressive acts does not 
negate its expressive nature both in its parts and in its whole.  It is certainly 
much more than mere expression, but recognizing that fact does not in any way 
negate that worship services constitute an expressive activity qualifying for 
protection under the First Amendment.  Indeed, in Widmar, the first of the 
limited public forum cases involving religious speech, the Court expressly 
stated that worship is a form of speech protected under the Free Speech 
Clause.209 
Attempting to draw a distinction between a worship service and worship, or 
between worship and its express elements, is of little value and misleading.  A 
ban on using school facilities for worship services or for worship is a ban on 
speech protected under the First Amendment.  The real question is whether 
such a ban constitutes viewpoint discrimination, or is best seen as a viewpoint-
neutral content restriction.  The restriction is valid if the latter, but 
unconstitutional if the former.210 
As noted earlier, the question is not as simple as the issue presented in 
Lamb’s Chapel, Rosenberger, and Good News Club, each which clearly 
prohibited religious perspectives on topics that individuals might have 
otherwise addressed in the created forum.  As argued by the majority in Bronx 
Household IV, the policy does not prohibit religious viewpoints per se, and 
permits religious views on a variety of subjects—certainly any subject that one 
might address from a secular perspective.211  Though a ban on worship 
obviously constitutes content discrimination, because particular speech content 
is prohibited, it does not amount to viewpoint discrimination. 
On closer examination, however, such an argument fails.  To ban worship 
and its expressive components bans particular views and ways of understanding 
and communicating about fundamental questions of life, such as who God is, 
who we are, and about the meaning of life.  Each of the elements of worship, as 
well as the worship as a whole, communicates, and is intended to communicate, 
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views about the important questions we face in life.212 
To say that those views can still be presented in the form of discussion, 
debate, and teaching, is to alter the views communicated.  Views about God, 
the world, human nature, and so forth are inevitably different when expressed 
in the context of worship, revealing understandings and beliefs not fully 
captured in other formats.  Songs of praise, prayers of confession, liturgy, and 
even preaching constitute expressive conduct where the means of 
communication are integral to a full understanding of the views expressed.  To 
attempt to disconnect views that might be expressed from the means of 
expression not only changes the meaning, but for some people may be 
completely impossible to express.213 
For this reason, any prohibition of worship services from a limited public 
forum open to various speech topics inevitably, and in very real ways, 
constitutes viewpoint discrimination.214  The fact that all worship is prohibited 
in public schools, no matter what the theological content, hardly makes it any 
better.  As noted by the Supreme Court in Rosenberger, banning multiple views 
on a topic does not make a restriction any more constitutional.215 
Therefore, prohibiting worship services in public schools when a limited 
public forum is created for other community uses will typically constitute 
unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.  It will, of course, partly turn on the 
policy in question and the particular facts of the case.  In contexts similar to the 
Bronx Household litigation, prohibition of religious worship is almost certainly 
viewpoint discrimination.  This is consistent with the Supreme Court’s analysis 
in other limited forum cases involving exclusion of religious speech, where it 
has consistently and appropriately found such exclusions to constitute 
viewpoint discrimination.216  As problematic as the Second Circuit’s free 
speech analysis was in Bronx Household IV, the most disturbing part of the 
court’s opinion was its Establishment Clause analysis, where the Court 
suggested that permitting religious worship services in public schools raised 
significant Establishment Clause concerns. The next section of the article will 
address this issue. 
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IV.  WORSHIP IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
The most troubling aspect of the majority opinion in Bronx Household IV 
was its treatment of the Establishment Clause issue.217  Although the Second 
Circuit was careful to clarify that it was not saying that allowing worship in 
public schools would in fact violate the Establishment Clause, only that it was 
reasonable for the school district to believe that it might, its analysis strongly 
suggests that allowing worship posed significant Establishment Clause 
problems.218  Indeed, the court stated that there was a “strong basis” to believe 
such a practice would violate the Establishment Clause.219 
This is troubling because it might lead school districts who want to 
accommodate religious groups by making their facilities available for worship 
decline to do so because of Establishment Clause concerns.  Even if a court 
determines that exclusion of worship services from public schools does not 
violate the Free Speech or Free Exercise clauses, schools should still be free to 
allow worship services if they so choose.  Indeed, many, if not most, school 
districts have no problem letting religious groups use their facilities for worship 
at appropriate times.  This is what is called “play in the joints,” where even if 
the state is not required to accommodate religion under the Free Exercise or 
Free Speech clauses, it is still permitted to do so under the Establishment 
Clause.220 
The Supreme Court has employed a variety of tests over the years for 
resolving Establishment Clause issues, including the Lemon test, endorsement 
test, and coercion test.  The Lemon tripartite test requires that valid government 
action must have a secular purpose, have a primary effect that neither advances 
nor inhibits religion, and avoid excessive entanglement with religion.221  
Although at one time the Lemon test dominated Establishment Clause 
analysis,222  its influence has greatly diminished over the past quarter-century 
and the Court often completely ignores the test.223  In the context of religion in 
public schools, the Court has often used the first prong of the Lemon test to 
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invalidate government action where government itself promotes a religious 
agenda.224  As discussed in Part II.B, the primary focus in cases involving 
religion in public schools has been between government-promoted prayer or 
religious exercise, which inevitably violates the Establishment Clause, and 
privately-initiated religious exercise, which is permitted and sometimes 
protected under the First Amendment.225 
With regard to the coercion and endorsement tests, the Court continues to 
apply both tests to varying degrees depending on the particular Establishment 
Clause concern before the Court.226  It is fair to say that government coercion 
of religious exercise always violates the Constitution.227  Government 
endorsement of religion also violates the Establishment Clause, though both 
tests are subject to a variety of interpretations.  Common to both approaches, 
however, is that it is government action—either coercing religious exercise or 
endorsing religion—that is impermissible.228 
In the context of resolving Establishment Clause issues in the limited public 
forum, however, the Court has largely resorted to a neutrality analysis.  
Neutrality has long been an important part of Establishment Clause analysis, 
dating back to the Court’s initial Establishment Clause case in Everson v. 
Board of Education229 and to the Schempp school prayer decision.230  But the 
past quarter century has seen neutrality emerge as one of the Court’s primary 
analytical vehicles for resolving an assortment of Establishment Clause 
issues.231 
 
 224.  See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 585-86 (1987) (describing second and third prongs of 
Lemon test as unnecessary); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56-57 (1985) (applying first prong); Stone v. 
Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41-43 (1980) (holding statute unconstitutional under first prong of Lemon). 
 225.  See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 302, 313 (2000) (permitting voluntary prayer 
but prohibiting state-sponsored prayer); Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990) (plurality opinion) 
(discussing difference between government promotion of religion and private promotion of religion). 
 226.  See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688-89 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (clarifying 
“endorsement test” in determining display of nativity scene did not violate Establishment Clause). 
 227.  See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992).  “It is beyond dispute that, at a minimum, the 
Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its 
exercise, or otherwise and in a way which establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.” Id. 
(internal citations omitted). 
 228.  See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 301-10; Lee, 505 U.S. at 586-88.  In both Santa Fe Independent School 
District v. Doe and Lee v. Weisman, both of which applied a coercion test, the Court spent considerable time at 
the beginning of its analysis establishing that the prayers in those cases were attributable to the state.  Santa Fe, 
530 U.S. at 301-10; Lee, 505 U.S. at 586-88.  The Court’s endorsement test examines whether the 
government’s acts create the perception of endorsement. 
 229.  330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947). 
 230.  See Sch. Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 215-22 (1963). 
 231.  See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 114 (2001); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 
U.S. 793, 809 (2000); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 839-40 (1995); Bd. of 
Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 696-705 (1994); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 10 (1993).  
See generally Carl H. Esbeck, A Constitutional Case for Governmental Cooperation with Faith-Based Social 
Service Providers, 46 EMORY L.J. 1 (1997); Dhananjai Shivakumar, Neutrality and the Religion Clauses, 33 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 505 (1998). 
  
2015] SCHOOLS, WORSHIP, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 41 
This has been particularly true in the context of the limited public forum 
cases, where the Court has relied almost exclusively on the neutrality of the 
created forum to find that inclusion of religious speech in a school-created 
forum would not violate the Establishment Clause.  This was first hinted at in 
Widmar, where the Court applied the Lemon test and held that providing equal 
access to a public forum to religious groups would not have a primary effect of 
advancing religion.232  In particular, the Court noted that an equal-access policy 
would not confer the state’s imprimatur on religion, because it would be 
treating student religious groups the same as any other student groups.233  The 
Court made a similar observation in Lamb’s Chapel, stating that under the 
circumstances, where other community groups repeatedly used school property, 
there was no realistic danger of perceived endorsement.234  Although the Court 
did not specifically stress neutrality in these cases, it was essentially the neutral 
treatment of religion that prevented Establishment Clause violations. 
This emphasis on neutrality in addressing the Establishment Clause issue 
came to the forefront in the other three limited forum cases—Mergens, 
Rosenberger, and Good News Club.  As noted earlier, these cases increasingly 
began to stress neutrality in rejecting Establishment Clause concerns.235  For 
example, Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion in Mergens explains that 
inclusion of religious groups would not violate the Establishment Clause, as the 
basic message of the Equal Access Act was “one of neutrality rather than 
endorsement; if a State refused to let religious groups use facilities open to 
others, then it would demonstrate not neutrality but hostility toward 
religion.”236  Justices Scalia and Kennedy, in a concurring opinion, similarly 
stressed that neutral treatment of religious groups satisfied the Establishment 
Clause.237 
The Court’s two most recent cases, Rosenberger and Good News Club, have 
particularly emphasized the importance of neutrality in Establishment Clause 
analysis.  The Court began its Establishment Clause discussion in Rosenberger 
 
 232.  See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 273 (1981). 
 233.  See id. at 274. 
 234.  Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 395 (1993).  In Lamb’s Chapel 
the Court said: 
 
The showing of this film series would not have been during school hours, would not have been 
sponsored by the school, and would have been open to the public, not just to church members.  The 
[school] property had repeatedly been used by a wide variety of private organizations.  Under these 
circumstances, as in Widmar, there would have been no realistic danger that the community would 
think that the [school] was endorsing religion or any particular creed, and any benefit to religion or 
to the Church would have been no more than incidental. 
 
Id. 
 235.  See supra Part I.C. 
 236.  Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 248 (1990). 
 237.  See id. at 260 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (explaining agreement with plurality). 
  
42 SUFFOLK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. XLVIII:9 
by stating, “[a] central lesson of our decisions is that a significant factor in 
upholding governmental programs in the face of Establishment Clause attack is 
their neutrality towards religion,” noting that it had previously applied that 
principle “to religious speakers who participate in broad-reaching government 
programs neutral in design.”238 On that basis, the Court held that including a 
religious publication in the university’s funding program for student groups 
would not violate the Establishment Clause, because it would simply be 
treating religion neutrally, not preferentially.239  Similarly, the Court in Good 
News Club characterized neutrality as a significant factor in its Establishment 
Clause analysis, stating that “[b]ecause allowing the Club to speak on school 
grounds would ensure neutrality, not threaten it, [the school] face[d] an uphill 
battle in arguing that the Establishment Clause compels it to exclude the Good 
News Club.”240  Thus, though neutrality was not dispositive, it created a strong 
presumption of constitutionality. 
It is not surprising that the Court so strongly stresses neutrality and related 
concepts in these decisions, because neutrality reinforces some of the Court’s 
basic Establishment Clause concerns.  First, a program’s neutrality ensures that 
any religious speech emanates from private choices, rather than government.  
As noted earlier, a fundamental distinction in many Establishment Clause cases 
is that government itself has no business promoting religion, but privately 
initiated religious action generally poses no constitutional threat.241  This is 
most clearly seen in the school prayer cases, where the Court has drawn a 
fundamental distinction between government-sponsored prayer or religious 
activity that inevitably violates the Establishment Clause, and student-initiated 
prayer—a constitutionally permitted and often protected practice.242  The focus, 
therefore, is whether the religious exercise is primarily attributable to the state 
or to private parties. 
Where religious exercise such as worship arises from a neutral program open 
to various participants, the religious exercise is clearly attributable to private 
parties and not to the government.243  This is certainly true of worship services 
that might occur through a neutral limited forum program.  Any worship 
occurring in such situations is attributable to the private choice of parties using 
the facility, rather than to the government itself. 
Neutrality also reinforces Establishment Clause values relating to 
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endorsement concerns.  The Court has often expressed sensitivity to this topic 
with regard to religion in public schools.  As the Court has noted in various 
public forum cases, religious speech in the context of a neutral limited forum 
negates any concerns of perceived state endorsement of religion.244  In such 
situations, the objective observer will attribute the religious speech not to the 
government, but to the choice of the private party.  The endorsement issue will 
be discussed more fully below, but a neutral program negates concerns of the 
state’s endorsement of the religious speech in question. 
Thus, if worship services occur as part of a neutral program that treats 
religious speech and exercise the same as nonreligious speech, then it creates 
an extremely strong presumption of constitutionality.  As important as 
neutrality is to the Court’s Establishment Clause framework, however, it is not 
dispositive.  Instead, the Court’s cases suggest the possibility that other 
considerations might still indicate an Establishment Clause violation.  As noted 
above, the Court in Good News Club said the program’s neutrality created an 
uphill battle to show an Establishment Clause violation, but did not preclude 
the possibility altogether.245  Similarly, the Court in Rosenberger, though 
strongly emphasizing the program’s neutrality, also pointed to other factors 
mitigating Establishment Clause concerns.246 
As a starting point, the neutrality of programs where worship might occur on 
school property as part of a limited public forum creates a very strong 
presumption that the worship does not pose Establishment Clause concerns.  
The majority in Bronx Household IV failed to appreciate the importance of the 
program’s neutrality, and instead listed a variety of concerns, two of which are 
worth addressing.  First, the court suggested that allowing groups to use public 
school space for worship services without charging rent, as the New York 
program did, effectively amounted to subsidization of religious worship.247  
The court noted that the community groups using school space do not pay rent 
nor cover the cost of utilities, such as electricity, gas, and air conditioning.248  
The court characterized the use of school space for worship as “foot[ing] a 
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major portion of the costs of the operation of a church.”249  It saw this practice 
as potentially fostering an excessive entanglement with religion that is 
prohibited under the Establishment Clause.250 
The problem with this argument is that it would prohibit use of limited 
public forum space by any religious group—a position the Supreme Court has 
thoroughly rejected.  As noted by Judge Walker in his Bronx Household IV 
dissent, whenever a school provides free space and utilities to any group for its 
use, a subsidy exists.251  This was in fact true in four limited-public forum cases 
that the Supreme Court decided—Widmar, Mergens, Lamb’s Chapel, and Good 
News Club.  Yet the Court rejected the Establishment Clause concerns in all 
four cases as long as access to the forum was the same for both religious and 
nonreligious groups alike.  As noted by the Court in Rosenberger, 
 
The government usually acts by spending money.  Even the provision of a 
meeting room, as in Mergens and Widmar, involved governmental expenditure, 
if only in the form of electricity and heating or cooling costs. . . .  If the 
expenditure of governmental funds is prohibited whenever those funds pay for 
a service that is, pursuant to a religion-neutral program, used by a group for 
sectarian purposes, then Widmar, Mergens, and Lamb’s Chapel would have to 
be overruled.252 
 
In Rosenberger, the form of subsidy was even more dramatic than in Bronx 
Household IV.  Instead of free use of space and modest utilities, as in the four 
other limited public forum cases, the Rosenberger student group essentially 
received funds to publish a blatantly Christian publication.253  As noted earlier, 
this was a sensitive Establishment Clause issue because direct funding of 
religion deeply concerned the Founders when the United States adopted the 
Establishment Clause.254  Nevertheless, the Court in Rosenberger held the 
provision of such funds would be constitutional, largely because the funds 
would be part of a neutral program that applied to all eligible student groups.255 
The subsidization in Bronx Household IV is minor compared to the subsidy 
permitted in Rosenberger, and is essentially the equivalent of that approved in 
Widmar, Mergens, Lamb’s Chapel, and Good News Club.  Indeed, permitting 
modest benefits to flow to religion on the same terms as provided to 
nonreligious persons is consistent with the Establishment Clause, even if such 
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benefits indirectly subsidize religious exercise.256  Therefore, there is little to 
support the first concern that the Bronx Household IV majority voiced. 
The second Establishment Clause concern that the majority raised was that 
permitting worship services on public school facilities would amount to a 
perceived state endorsement of the worship and religion.  This was the 
majority’s primary Establishment Clause concern, as it directed most of its 
Establishment Clause discussion to the endorsement issue.  As the court stated 
near the end of its analysis: 
 
the use of New York City public schools for religious worship services—with a 
heavy predominance of Christian worship services because school buildings are 
most available for non-school use on Sundays—would create a very substantial 
appearance of governmental endorsement of religion and give the Board a 
strong basis to fear that permitting such use would violate the Establishment 
Clause.257 
 
The majority based its conclusion on several perceived concerns under the 
facts of the case.  First, and most significantly, the court based its reasoning 
around the perception that Christian churches dominated community use of 
school facilities on Sunday mornings, stating that some schools effectively 
became churches on Sunday mornings.258  The court also discussed how the 
church brought further attention to religious use of the school by posting signs 
and distributing flyers outside.259  The majority stated that as a result,  “both 
church congregants and members of the public identify the churches with the 
schools.”260  Second, the court also expressed concerns that “young and 
impressionable students” might be particularly likely to “mistake the 
consequences of a neutral policy for endorsement.”261 
Concerns about perceived government endorsement of religion have long 
informed the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence.  Sensitivity 
to endorsement concerns in Establishment Clause analysis took on a special 
focus in 1984, however, with the advent of Justice O’Connor’s endorsement 
test in a concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly.262  In Lynch, the Court 
addressed the constitutionality of a nativity scene on public property and held 
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that no Establishment Clause violation existed under Lemon.263  Although 
Justice O’Connor joined the majority opinion, she wrote a concurring opinion 
to sharpen the Court’s focus under Lemon.  She argued that the real concern is 
whether a government action endorses religion, and thus advocated for what is 
now known as her endorsement test.264 
In the years since Lynch, the endorsement concerns that Justice O’Connor’s 
concurring opinion raised have become an increasingly significant part of 
Establishment Clause analysis.  The Court has never officially adopted the 
endorsement test per se, and some justices have expressed doubts about it, but 
an important focus of the Court has often been sensitivity to possible 
government endorsement of religion.265  To some extent, the endorsement test’s 
role depends on the particular Establishment Clause issue before the Court, as 
some issues lend themselves to an endorsement analysis.  Even Justice 
O’Connor resorts to the test more or less often depending on the issues 
involved.266 
In the limited public forum cases involving religious speech, the Court 
occasionally mentions endorsement concerns, though often in a perfunctory 
manner.  As noted above, the Court in Widmar essentially raised an 
endorsement concern when it noted that inclusion of a religious group on equal 
terms with other groups would not put the state’s imprimatur on religion.267  
Similarly, Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion in Mergens stressed that the 
message given by an equal access policy was “one of neutrality rather than 
endorsement.”268  Lastly, in Lamb’s Chapel, the Court stated that under the 
circumstances of the cases there was “no realistic danger that the community 
would think that the District was endorsing religion or any particular 
creed . . . .”269 
Thus, in all these cases, the Court thought it was important to acknowledge 
the issue of endorsement, but dispensed with any endorsement concerns quite 
readily.270  As mentioned before, the Court’s dismissal of endorsement 
concerns is not surprising given the close connection between neutrality and 
endorsement.  When religious expression occurs pursuant to a neutral public 
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forum open to religious and nonreligious groups alike, any religious expression 
is attributable to the private choice of forum participants rather than to the 
actions of the state.  It is no surprise, therefore, that even though the Court has 
acknowledged the issue of endorsement with religious speech in limited public 
forums, it has consistently and quickly dismissed such concerns when the 
forum was found to be neutral.271 
The majority in Bronx Household IV acknowledged those cases, but believed 
worship services in public schools was different, even if pursuant to a neutral 
policy, because of the nature of the activity and the way it would dominate the 
forum on Sundays.272  In particular, the court noted that Sunday use of school 
property was almost exclusively for Christian worship, and that churches often 
advertised their presence at the building.  According to the majority, this results 
in “both church congregants and members of the public identify[ing] the 
churches with the schools.”273  This concern was compounded according to the 
court, because of the “impressionable” students who attended the schools and 
might be aware of that they were used for worship on Sunday mornings.274 
There are two related problems with this endorsement analysis.  First, as 
articulated by Justice O’Connor, the endorsement analysis must be seen from 
an objective observer’s perspective—one who has a full understanding of the 
background and context of the religious exercise in question.275  Thus, the 
bystander who merely sees or hears about a worship service in a public school 
on Sunday morning does not judge perceptions of endorsement.  Rather, the 
relevant judgment is the objective observer’s—the individuals who are aware 
of the Board’s policy of opening public school facilities to various community 
groups regardless of religious affiliation, and are aware that use for worship is 
only one of many different uses for which schools are being used.  To such an 
observer, it is difficult to attribute state endorsement to the worship any more 
than the state would be endorsing other community activities occurring on 
school property during the week. 
The second problem associated with the Bronx Household IV majority 
analysis is the narrow way in which it framed the relevant forum.  Religious 
worship might dominate the created forum if the forum only consists of certain 
buildings on Sunday mornings.  The relevant forum, however, is the school 
buildings during non-school hours throughout the week, as opposed to Sunday 
mornings only.  The fact that a particular use might dominate one narrow 
segment of the forum should not skew the endorsement analysis.276  Rather, one 
 
 271.  See supra notes 267-69 and accompanying text (discussing Mergens, Lamb’s Chapel, and Widmar). 
 272.  See 650 F.3d 30 (2d Cir. 2011). 
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 274.  See id. 
 275.  See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring); see also McCreary Cnty. 
v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 862 (2005). 
 276.  See Matich, supra note 18, at 1164 (stating what constitutes forum “evaluated at the level of the 
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should view the forum as it was created and operates, which encompasses all 
eligible properties during all eligible times throughout the week.  From this 
perspective, an observer is unlikely to perceive religious worship as dominating 
the forum, but instead as one part of a greater whole, where access to school 
property is granted on the same terms as to everyone else.  As the Supreme 
Court has repeatedly explained, there is no reason to attribute state endorsement 
of religion in such circumstances. 
Concerns about “young and impressionable students” perceiving 
endorsement might be interpreted in numerous ways.277  The Court has, at 
times, emphasized sensitivity about how impressionable young students are 
when discussing religion in public schools,278 but this concern typically arises 
where the state itself promotes religion such as through prayer,279 posting of the 
Ten Commandments,280 or teaching creationism.281  The Court ought to be 
particularly vigilant when monitoring government’s own advancement of 
religion, especially around impressionable young students.  It is a much 
different matter, however, if government itself does not promote religion in 
school or at school-sponsored activities, but instead simply creates a forum for 
private speech. 
Even to the extent that the court takes student impressionability into account, 
arguably the occurrence of worship on Sundays mitigates rather than advances 
endorsement concerns.  Sundays are a time when students themselves are less 
likely to come into contact with the religious activity in question, as opposed to 
the activity occurring during the week at school.  Moreover, even to the extent 
a young student is aware that the school building is used for worship, it occurs 
at a time that the school is not in operation.  Both of these create a distance 
between the normal school activity and the religious activity, lessening, not 
increasing, potential problems of endorsement. 
As the dissent in Bronx Household IV argued, the potential for perceived 
endorsement is greater if the religious activity occurs immediately after school, 
such as in Good News Club.282  There, the club wanted to meet in a school 
classroom immediately after school and invite students in the school itself.  The 
meetings included learning Bible verses, singing Christian songs, hearing a 
Bible story, and closing with prayer—meetings that Justice Souter’s dissent 
 
school district”).   If evaluation is at a level other than the school district, the districts could manipulate what 
constitutes a forum to create appearance of viewpoint domination.  See id. 
 277.  See Bronx Household IV, 650 F.3d at 42 (observing potential for young, impressionable students to 
mistake neutral policy for endorsement). 
 278.  See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583-85 (1987) (noting Court’s vigilance in monitoring 
religion in public schools because of impressionable young students). 
 279.  See supra Part I.B. 
 280.  See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 39-40 (1980) (per curiam) (holding law at issue impermissibly 
endorses religion through creationism teachings). 
 281.  See Edwards, 482 U.S. at 583-85. 
 282.  See Bronx Household IV, 650 F.3d 30, 61-62 (2d Cir. 2011) (Walker, J., dissenting). 
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characterized as essentially “worship.”283  The close proximity in terms of time 
between the meeting and the school day arguably presented greater 
endorsement problems to impressionable minds than Sunday morning worship 
services; yet, the Court in Good News Club held no Establishment Clause 
violation existed and permitted such a meeting on a neutral basis. 
In sum, there is no reasonable basis to find that use of public school facilities 
for worship services, pursuant to a neutral community-use program, violate the 
Establishment Clause.  A program’s neutrality creates a strong presumption of 
constitutionality that is not overcome by a typical community-use program, as 
in Bronx Household.  Importantly, the program’s neutrality eliminates any 
potential endorsement concerns, because private parties, rather than the state, 
choose to use the school facility for worship. 
V.  FREE EXERCISE AND WORSHIP IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
As noted earlier, issues regarding religion and public schools primarily focus 
on the Establishment Clause and Free Speech Clause, with no significant 
attention to the Free Exercise Clause.  This is not surprising, since restrictions 
on religious activities typically occur in the context of a limited public forum, 
which is necessarily grounded in free speech principles.  Since the Supreme 
Court has consistently held that excluding religious speech from a limited 
public forum violates the Free Speech Clause, there was no reason to examine 
whether the exclusion might also violate the Free Exercise Clause.284 
By rejecting the free speech claim in Bronx Household IV, however, the 
Second Circuit opened the door to a more thorough examination of the free 
exercise claim.  Although the district court found that the prohibition on 
“religious worship services” violated the church’s right to free exercise of 
religion, the Second Circuit in Bronx Household V, once again reversed, 
finding no violation.285 
This section will briefly discuss whether exclusion of worship services 
violates the free exercise of religion.  Part V.A will provide a brief overview of 
free exercise jurisprudence, Part V.B will then examine the Second Circuit’s 
decision in Bronx Household V, and Part V.C will discuss whether excluding 
worship services from an otherwise broad community-use policy violates the 
Free Exercise Clause. 
A.  Free Exercise Doctrine 
The Supreme Court’s earliest free exercise cases did not suggest a 
 
 283.  See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 112 n.4 (2001) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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particularly expansive protection for religious liberty.286  This changed 
substantially with the Court’s 1963 decision in Sherbert v. Verner.287  In 
Sherbert, the Court reviewed a South Carolina statute that denied 
unemployment benefits to a Seventh-day Adventist because she refused to 
work on Saturday due to her religious beliefs.288  In finding the denial of 
benefits unconstitutional, the Court employed a two-step analysis for resolving 
free exercise questions.  First, a court must determine whether the government 
in fact infringes upon a person’s free exercise right.  Second, if the government 
does infringe such rights, then the action is subject to strict scrutiny, requiring 
that the infringement is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling 
state interest.289  In applying this test, the Court held that the government 
infringed on free exercise, noting that the law forced the claimant to choose 
between her religion and receipt of important government benefits, thereby 
placing the same kind of burden on her beliefs as a direct prohibition.290  The 
Court further held that the state did not have a compelling interest in not 
granting a religious exemption, since the state could still meet its interest in 
avoiding fraud by creating an exemption for Sabbatarians.291 
This two-step free exercise analysis, which held sway for nearly three 
decades, was significant in several respects.  It made clear that even neutral and 
generally applicable laws not focused on religion can trigger free exercise 
concerns and heightened scrutiny if the law, as applied to a particular person, 
imposes a significant burden on religious exercise.292  For example, in 
Wisconsin v. Yoder the Court held that Wisconsin’s compulsory education law, 
which required school attendance until sixteen, violated the rights of the Amish 
because their religion prohibited attending school after the eighth grade.293  
Thus, the Court primarily focused not on whether religion was unfairly targeted 
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or treated, but on the burden imposed on religion, even from a neutral program. 
This standard of analysis, requiring heightened scrutiny for even incidental 
but substantial burdens on religion, came to an abrupt end in 1990 in 
Employment Division v. Smith.294  There, two Native Americans had ingested 
peyote as part of a religious observance at their Native American church.295  
Use of peyote was illegal under Oregon law, and as a result, the two men were 
fired from their jobs as counselors at a private drug rehabilitation center.296  
They were subsequently deemed ineligible for unemployment benefits, since 
they had been discharged for work-related misconduct.297  The two men 
challenged the dismissal as violating their free exercise rights, arguing that the 
law imposed a substantial burden on their free exercise of religion because 
peyote use serves sacramental purposes in their church.298 
The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that the law did not violate the 
free exercise rights of the claimants, articulating an analysis that substantially 
changed free exercise jurisprudence.  The Court began by recognizing the 
noncontroversial proposition that the First Amendment prohibits 
“governmental regulation of religious beliefs as such.”299  When it comes to 
religious conduct, however, the Smith Court drew a fundamental distinction 
between laws that specifically target religion, which are subject to strict 
scrutiny, and neutral laws of general applicability that incidentally burden 
religion.300  According to the Court, the latter category does not infringe on free 
exercise, no matter how substantial the burden on religious exercise.301  It is 
only the former type of restrictions, those that target religion with unique 
burdens, that trigger heightened constitutional scrutiny.  Since the case before 
the Court involved a neutral and generally applicable law, it held there was no 
free exercise infringement.302 
The Court, in rejecting the application of the “compelling government 
interest” test to neutral and generally applicable laws of the type before it, 
noted that the compelling government interest test is reserved for unequal 
treatment.303  Thus, the Court noted that it reserves strict scrutiny for 
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differential treatment of race, but not for race-neutral laws that have a 
disproportionate impact on race.304  Similarly, content distinctions on speech 
invoke strict scrutiny, whereas content-neutral speech restrictions do not.305  
Thus, according to the Court, the compelling government interest test is 
designed to produce “equality of treatment.”306 
The Court applied Smith’s free exercise analysis just three years later, in 
Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah.307  In this case, 
adherents of the Santeria religion, who practice animal sacrifice as a principal 
form of worship, leased land in Hialeah, Florida, to establish a house of 
worship and other facilities.308  In response, the city council held an emergency 
meeting and passed a series of ordinances directed toward the church.309  
Although the ordinances were facially neutral with regard to the Santeria 
religion, the ordinances prohibited cruelty to animals, animal “sacrifice,” and 
slaughtering of animals outside of restricted zones.310  At the same time, the 
ordinances contained numerous exceptions, such that the ordinances effectively 
only applied to Santeria and other religions that practice animal sacrifice.311 
The Supreme Court unanimously held the ordinances violated the Free 
Exercise Clause.  The Court began its analysis by reference to Smith, stating 
that neutral and generally applicable laws that burden religion do not trigger 
heightened scrutiny, but laws that fail to meet those requirements “must be 
justified by a compelling governmental interest and must be narrowly tailored 
to advance that interest.”312  The starting point to determine whether a law is 
neutral or not is to examine the text; at a minimum, the law must not 
discriminate on its face.313  The Court acknowledged that the language of the 
ordinances was facially neutral, but said that was only the beginning, not the 
end of the analysis.314  Instead, the Court proceeded to examine the entire 
record of the case, which clearly demonstrated “that suppression of the central 
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element of the Santeria worship service was the object of the ordinances.”315  
This was reflected in a number of factors, including the legislative record, the 
sequence of events, language used in the ordinances, and, perhaps most 
importantly, the only conduct subject to the ordinances was “the religious 
exercise of Santeria church members.”316  Taken as a whole, the Court said 
there was no doubt that the purpose of the ordinance was to suppress the 
Santeria religion.  Stating that “[a] law burdening religious practice that is not 
neutral or not of general application must undergo the most rigorous of 
scrutiny,” the Court explained the law was neither supported by a compelling 
interest nor narrowly drawn, and thus unconstitutional.317 
Taken together, Smith and Lukumi established what appeared to be a clear 
neutrality approach to free exercise questions.  Neutral and generally applicable 
laws (as in Smith) do not trigger heightened scrutiny, whereas laws that burden 
religious practice that are not neutral or of general applicability (as in Lukumi) 
are subject to strict scrutiny, and are almost inevitably unconstitutional.  In two 
more recent cases, however, Locke v. Davey318 and Hosanna-Tabor 
Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission,319 the Court tweaked this analysis by indicating that laws that 
target religion with burdens might still be constitutional, and laws that treat 
religion neutrally might be subject to heightened scrutiny. 
In Locke, the Court reviewed a State of Washington scholarship program 
designed to assist academically promising students with their college 
educations.  Although students could use the scholarship for studies at religious 
institutions, the state constitution prohibited use of the scholarship to pursue a 
“devotional theology degree.”320  The state awarded Davey a scholarship, but 
told him that he could not use it to pursue a major in pastoral ministries, which 
was conceded to be a devotional theology degree.321  Davey sued, claiming 
inter alia that the scholarship program was not neutral toward religion, and thus 
violated the Free Exercise Clause.322 
The Supreme Court held that the program did not violate the Free Exercise 
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Clause.323  In holding the program constitutional, the Court acknowledged that 
the Establishment Clause did not prohibit use of the scholarships for devotional 
theology degrees; indeed, an earlier Supreme Court case held that use of state 
monies under such circumstances did not violate the Establishment Clause.324  
The Court recognized, however, that the scholarship program was not neutral 
toward religion in that it excluded a particular type of religious study.  But the 
Court explained that this was an example of “play in the joints,” where the 
Establishment Clause permits a state action that the Free Exercise Clause does 
not require.325  In other words, the state could choose to include devotional 
theology degrees if it wanted, but was free to exclude them under the Free 
Exercise Clause. 
In holding that the disparate treatment of religion did not violate the Free 
Exercise Clause, the Court drew three distinctions with the discriminatory 
treatment of religion in Lukumi.  First, the Court noted that, unlike Lukumi, 
where religious adherents were subject to criminal sanctions, the disfavor of 
religion in the case before it was “far milder.”326  The Court noted that the 
program imposed neither criminal nor civil sanctions, did not deny the right of 
political participation, nor required students “[t]o choose between their 
religious beliefs and receiving a government benefit.”327  Instead, the Court 
said the state simply chose “not to fund a distinct category of instruction.”328 
Second, even though funding devotional theology degrees would not violate 
the Establishment Clause, the Court deferred to the special concerns that led the 
State of Washington to prohibit funding to the education of clergy.  Indeed, the 
Court stated it could “think of few areas in which a State’s antiestablishment 
interests come more into play.”329  In recognizing this, the Court noted the 
special sensitivities that funding of clergy played as an impetus to the 
Establishment Clause.  This was reflected not only in James Madison’s 
Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (Memorial and 
Remonstrance), and the subsequent Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty, but also 
in numerous state constitutions at the time which prohibited use of public funds 
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for ministry.330 
Finally, the Court noted that, unlike the ordinances in Lukumi, the 
scholarship program in Davey showed no evidence of hostility toward religion.  
Instead, the program allowed students to use their scholarships at religious 
schools and to take distinctly religious classes, including devotional theology 
classes.331  They just could not use the scholarships to obtain a degree in 
devotional theology.332  The Court thus concluded that there was nothing in 
either the text of the state constitution nor the operation of the program that 
suggested animus toward religion.333  It concluded by saying, “[g]iven the 
historic and substantial state interest at issue, we therefore cannot conclude that 
the denial of funding for vocational religious instruction alone is inherently 
constitutionally suspect.”334 
The second and most recent case tweaking of the Smith/Lukumi neutrality 
analysis is Hosanna-Tabor.  Whereas Locke indicated that in limited 
circumstances a non-neutral law targeting religion might still be constitutional, 
Hosanna-Tabor indicated that even neutral and generally applicable laws might 
violate the Free Exercise Clause.  In that case, a church-school dismissed a 
“called teacher,” who had the title and status of a minister, ostensibly for a 
disability.  The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) sued, 
claiming the dismissal violated the Americans with Disabilities Act.335 
The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the Religion Clauses of the First 
Amendment created a “ministerial exception” to anti-discrimination laws.336  
The Court was careful to limit this exception, for the time being, to the 
immediate facts of the case, but stated the right of religious institutions to 
appoint and dismiss their ministers was inherent in both the Free Exercise 
Clause and the Establishment Clause.337  This was necessary to ensure non-
interference with the basic governance, doctrine, and mission of religious 
institutions, which should be free from government control.338  Although the 
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law applied was neutral and of general applicability, the Court said the Smith 
analysis did not apply in a situation that concerned the internal affairs and 
leadership of a religious body.339 
Taken together, Locke and Hosanna-Tabor reflect modest but important 
limitations on the Smith/Lukumi neutrality analysis.  Locke demonstrates that in 
limited circumstances a non-neutral law targeting religion might not trigger 
heightened scrutiny, whereas Hosanna-Tabor demonstrates that some religious 
values are so fundamental that they are insulated from even a neutral and 
generally applicable law.  As a practical matter, however, the Smith/Lukumi 
neutrality approach governs unless these modest limitations apply.  The next 
section of this article will briefly discuss the decision in Bronx Household V, in 
which the Second Circuit held that exclusion of “religious worship services” 
from a forum allowing community use of public school facilities did not violate 
the Free Exercise Clause. 
B.  Bronx Household V and the Free Exercise Clause 
The initial litigation in Bronx Household focused on the church’s free speech 
claim, culminating in the Second Circuit’s final rejection of that claim in Bronx 
Household IV.340  At that point, the church again moved for a preliminary 
injunction against enforcement of the Board’s prohibition of worship services, 
this time on free exercise grounds.341  The district court again sided with the 
church, first granting a preliminary injunction342 and then a permanent 
injunction on the grounds that the Board’s regulation violated the Free Exercise 
Clause.343  In doing so, the district court primarily emphasized that by 
prohibiting worship services, but allowing other activities, the Board 
discriminated against religion, triggering strict scrutiny under the Supreme 
Court’s decisions in Smith and Lukumi.344 
Once again, the Second Circuit, in a 2–1 decision reversed the district court, 
holding that the Board’s regulation did not violate the Free Exercise Clause.345  
In doing so, the court essentially interpreted current free exercise jurisprudence 
as only prohibiting selective treatment of religion that imposes burdens, but 
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permitting the selective withholding of benefits and subsidies when 
accompanied by significant Establishment Clause concerns.346  It began its 
analysis by rejecting the strict scrutiny applied in Lukumi, drawing several 
distinctions between the two cases.  In particular, it stressed that Lukumi 
involved the targeted imposition of burdens on religion, whereas the Board’s 
regulation in the case before it simply declined to provide a subsidy to religion 
because of Establishment Clause concerns.347  Moreover, the court reasoned 
that Lukumi involved clear animus toward the targeted religion, whereas the 
Board showed no animus.348 
The court then proceeded to what it considered the controlling precedent, 
Locke, with facts it described as “very similar” to those in Bronx Household.349  
In particular, the court noted three ways in which the case before it was 
essentially the same as Locke.  First, unlike Lukumi, which involved a 
significant burden on religion in the form of a criminal sanction, Locke simply 
refused to fund religious instruction.  Similarly, the court said the Board’s 
regulation merely withheld a subsidy from a very narrow type of religious 
activity, an action that imposed only a marginal burden.350  Second, as in Locke 
and unlike in Lukumi, there was no evidence that the Board’s regulation 
resulted from animus or disfavor toward religion.351 
Third, and perhaps most importantly, the court stressed that, as in Locke, 
substantial Establishment Clause concerns governed the exclusion of religious 
worship services.352  These concerns, coupled with the lack of animus and a 
relatively minor impact on religious exercise, indicated that the court should 
not apply strict scrutiny and that the regulation excluding worship services was 
constitutionally permissible.  As stated by the court: 
 
We see no meaningful distinctions between [Locke and the present cases].  Our 
record reveals no animus toward religion generally or toward a particular 
religion or religious practice in either the [Board’s regulation] or the operation 
of [the] Board’s policy.  Underlying the Board’s prohibition is a slightly 
different manifestation of the same historical and constitutional aversion to the 
use of public funds to support the practice of religion cited by the Court in 
Locke.  As in Locke, the Board’s interest in respecting the principle of the 
Establishment Clause that disfavors public funding of religion is substantial, 
and the burden, if it can properly be called a burden, that falls on Bronx 
Household in needing to find a location that is not subsidized by the City for 
 
 346.  See id. at 191-93. 
 347.  See Bronx Household V, 750 F.3d 184, 192 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 348.  See id. at 192-93. 
 349.  Id. at 193. 
 350.  See id. at 194-95. 
 351.  See Bronx Household V, 750 F.3d at 194. 
 352.  See id. 
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the conduct of its religious worship services, is minor from a constitutional 
point of view.353 
 
Thus, as a practical matter, the Second Circuit saw Locke as controlling.  
What emerges from its free exercise analysis is a willingness to allow 
government actions that disfavor religion when the resulting burden is minor 
and justified by significant Establishment Clause concerns. Although those 
were the primary concerns reflected in Locke, it is questionable whether Locke 
is as controlling as the Second Circuit suggested.  The next section will 
examine the free exercise issue more fully, arguing that one should read Locke 
in a more limited fashion and is in fact quite distinguishable from the facts of 
Bronx Household. 
C.  Free Exercise and Exclusion of Worship from Schools 
The starting point for modern free exercise jurisprudence is the Smith and 
Lukumi neutrality standard, which states that neutral and generally applicable 
laws do not trigger free exercise protection.  Conversely, both decisions 
indicate that laws that target religion for unique burdens are subject to strict 
scrutiny.354  The Court strongly suggested this in Smith, where it stated that the 
purpose of a “compelling government interest” test is to ensure “equality of 
treatment,” which is lacking when unique burdens are imposed on religion.355  
Lukumi similarly emphasized that targeting religion with unique burdens 
triggers strict scrutiny, stating that “[a] law burdening religious practice that is 
not neutral or not of general application must undergo the most rigorous of 
scrutiny.”356  It further noted that “[a] law that targets religious conduct for 
distinctive treatment or advances legitimate governmental interests only against 
conduct with a religious motivation will survive strict scrutiny only in rare 
cases.”357 
A policy permitting community use of public school facilities that excludes 
worship services is neither neutral nor generally applicable, but instead targets 
religion for distinctly unfavorable treatment, and raises a presumption of strict 
scrutiny.  If strict scrutiny is applied, little doubt exists that the exclusion of 
worship services from a general community-use policy would be 
unconstitutional.  In particular, there would almost certainly be no compelling 
interest to justify such an exclusion.  The only interest school districts ever 
assert for exclusion is avoiding an Establishment Clause violation.  The 
 
 353.  Bronx Household V, 750 F.3d 184, 194-95 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 354.  See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993); Emp’t Div. v. 
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885-86 (1990). 
 355.  See Smith, 494 U.S. at 885-86. 
 356.  508 U.S. at 546. 
 357.  Id. 
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Supreme Court has never decided whether that constitutes a compelling interest 
to pass strict scrutiny for speech discrimination, and specifically declined to 
address the issue.358 
As noted in Part IV, however, permitting worship services on public school 
property clearly does not violate the Establishment Clause, or come anywhere 
near doing so.  Although sensitivity to some Establishment Clause concerns 
might justify disparate treatment of religion in very narrow circumstances 
under Locke, discussed below, anything short of an actual violation clearly falls 
short of a compelling interest.  Thus, if strict scrutiny is applied as required 
under Smith and Lukumi when religion is targeted for special burdens, then the 
exclusion of worship services clearly violates the Free Exercise Clause. 
The only question, therefore, is whether the general prohibition on targeting 
religion for disfavored treatment from Smith and Lukumi apply, or whether 
exclusion of worship might be viewed as coming within the Locke “play in the 
joints” analysis.  Although not completely clear, Locke is best seen as a rather 
limited exception to the general approach laid out in Smith and Lukumi.  Not 
only does the broad language in Lukumi suggest that any special targeting of 
religion normally triggers strict scrutiny, but the careful way in which the Court 
in Locke distinguished Lukumi suggests that the Court intended that the Locke 
exception be very limited.  Indeed, Locke is best understood as carving out an 
exception based on several considerations, most importantly a unique 
antiestablishment interest in excluding religion from a government program. 
Locke itself turned on three considerations:  the government motivation, the 
burden on religious exercise, and, most importantly, the antiestablishment 
concern raised by the state.359  In the context of excluding worship services 
from an otherwise broad community-use policy, the first two of these factors—
motivation and religious burden—are comparable to those in Locke and pose 
no free exercise concerns in themselves.  It of course depends on the particular 
facts of the case, but it is fair to assume that exclusion of worship from a 
school’s community-use program reflects genuine, if misplaced, concerns about 
separation of church and state rather than animus toward religion.  That was 
certainly true in the Bronx Household litigation, where the policy seemed to be 
grounded in sincere concerns about the Establishment Clause. 
Similarly, the burden on religion in such situations is rather modest, at least 
as compared to the burden in Lukumi.  As in Locke, prohibiting use of public 
 
 358.  See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).  The Court suggested that avoiding an Establishment 
Clause violation “may be characterized as compelling” and thus sufficient to justify a content-based restriction.  
See id. at 271.  It did not, however, find an Establishment Clause violation to exist.  In Good News Club, the 
Court said “[h]owever, it is not clear whether a State’s interest in avoiding an Establishment Clause violation 
would justify viewpoint discrimination.”  533 U.S. 98, 113 (2001).  The Court did not have to decide the issue 
in either case, however, because in both cases it held that inclusion granting religion equal access to a school 
forum would not violate the Establishment Clause.  See id. at 114-15; Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274-75. 
 359.  See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 720-25 (2004). 
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schools for worship imposes no criminal or civil penalties on religion.360  
Rather, it simply forecloses the opportunity to use school space for worship.  It 
neither penalizes the worship itself, interferes with how worship occurs, nor 
precludes churches from seeking alternative avenues to practice their faith.  
Moreover, absent creation of the forum, religious groups and others would have 
no right to use school space at all.361 
Exclusion from school property will pose real hardships to some religious 
bodies with limited resources, especially in an expensive real estate market 
such as New York City.  But this unfortunate reality cannot constitute a 
substantial government-imposed burden.  A similar burden most likely existed 
in Locke, where some students desiring to pursue a devotional theology degree 
lacked their own resources to do so.362  Such burdens, though real, reflect 
concerns and limitations independent of government action.  This is 
particularly true where creation of a community forum is optional for schools; 
schools can decide not to let any community groups, including churches, use 
the facilities if they want. 
Thus, the first two factors in the Bronx Household litigation are compatible 
with the type of “play in the joints” exception recognized in Locke.  It is the 
third factor, concerning unique Establishment Clause concerns, where a 
significant difference emerges.  This factor is certainly the most important one 
and, indeed, explains the primary rationale for the disparate treatment of 
religion not triggering heightened scrutiny in Locke.  The Locke Court indicated 
that although disparate treatment of religion typically triggers heightened 
scrutiny, the Court will tolerate disparate treatment if designed to address 
sensitive issues of separation of church and state.363  Thus, the Establishment 
Clause concern is not just one of three factors to be balanced, but is the 
lynchpin to the exception allowing disparate and disfavorable treatment of 
religion in limited situations. 
And it is here that a major difference emerges between the concerns in Locke 
and those regarding worship services on public school property.  As 
emphasized by the Court in Locke, the use of public funds to support clergy 
was a central concern giving rise to the Establishment Clause.364  Although use 
of scholarship funds would not violate the Establishment Clause, because “the 
link between government funds and religious training [would be] broken by the 
 
 360.  See id. at 720 (emphasizing prohibiting use of scholarship for devotional theology degree imposes no 
criminal or civil sanction). 
 361.  See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 44-46 (1983) (noting for limited 
public fora, state not under obligation to make fora available for speech); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 
206, at 1137. 
 362.  See Locke, 540 U.S. at 715-18. 
 363.  See id. at 725 (“Given the historic and substantial state interest at issue, we therefore cannot conclude 
that the denial of funding for vocational religious instruction alone is inherently constitutionally suspect.”). 
 364.  Id. at 722-23. 
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independent and private choice of recipients,” the Court nevertheless 
recognized the historical sensitivity of the issue. 365  In fact, the Court said there 
were “few areas in which a State’s antiestablishment interests come more into 
play.”366 
The historical context of the First Amendment’s adoption demonstrates this 
special sensitivity to use of public monies to fund clergy and ministry, which 
has often been viewed as a primary impetus for the Religious Clauses.367  The 
Supreme Court has often looked to the debate regarding religious assessments 
in Virginia in 1786, and in particular Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance, 
as providing some evidence of the principles underlying the Establishment 
Clause. 368  Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance, written in opposition to a 
proposed assessment to support churches in Virginia, addressed the harm that 
government financial support of religion posed to liberty of conscience and the 
free exercise of religion.  Subsequently, this document gave rise to the Virginia 
Bill for Religious Freedom, which similarly focused on financial support, 
asserting “[t]hat no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious 
worship, place or ministry whatsoever . . . .”369 
To the extent that other states addressed church-state issues in the years 
immediately preceding the Constitution, they also focused on compelled 
worship and state-sponsored financial support for churches.370  These state 
 
 365.  Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 719 (2004). 
 366.  Id. at 722. 
 367.  The colonies had a long history with various established churches, which in turn led to a tension with 
religious toleration.  At the earliest stages of colonial development, establishment included a litany of church-
state connections, such as voting restrictions and compulsory church attendance.  However, by the time of the 
American Revolution, the concept of establishment was limited to various forms of financial support for 
churches and ministry, religious oaths for officials, and official state recognition of religion.  See THOMAS J. 
CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS:  CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
1-77 (1986); see also LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE:  RELIGION AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 1-26 (1994). 
 368.  See James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in 8 THE PAPERS 
OF JAMES MADISON 298, 298-304 (Robert A. Rutland, et al. eds., 1973); see also Comm. for Pub. Educ. & 
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 770 n.28 (1973); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 13 (1947). 
 369.  See Bill for Religious Freedom, 1786, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS:  THE DRAFTS, 
DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 51, 52 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1987). 
 370.  See PA. CONST. of 1776, ch. I, § II, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS:  THE DRAFTS, 
DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS, supra note 369, at 32, 32.  For example, the Pennsylvania Constitution of 
1776 provided that, “[n]o man ought to or of right can be compelled to attend any religious worship, or erect or 
support any place of worship, or maintain any ministry, contrary to, or against, his own free will or consent.”  
Id.  Provisions in New Jersey, North Carolina, and Vermont similarly prohibited compelled worship and 
financial support of ministry and several other states enacted prohibitions on compelled worship and compelled 
financial support of ministry, but did permit, with consent, taxation for one’s own religion.  See N.J. CONST. of 
1776, § XVIII, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS:  THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS, 
supra note 369, at 25, 25; N.C. CONST. of 1776, § XXIV, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS:  THE 
DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS, supra note 369, at 30, 30-31; PA. CONST. of 1776, ch. I, § II, 
reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS:  THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS, supra note 369, 
at 32, 32; VT. CONST. of 1777, ch.I, § III, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS:  THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, 
SOURCES, AND ORIGINS, supra note 369, at 41, 41-42.  For example, the Maryland Declaration of Rights stated 
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constitutional provisions enacted in the years immediately following the 
Federal Constitution arguably provide the best insights into the church-state 
concerns that animated the First Amendment.  Though taking various forms, 
the state constitutions consistently addressed the dual concerns of compelled 
worship and financial support of churches and the ministry.  Even these 
concerns were not universally shared, since a few states still continued their 
previously established practices of financial support to the church.371  The 
opposition emerging during this time, however, was directed towards financial 
support of ministry and compelled worship.  As noted, Madison’s Memorial 
and Remonstrance expressed the same concerns, thereby further confirming the 
centrality of those concerns in our historical understanding of church-state 
issues.372 
It is not surprising, therefore, that the Supreme Court in Locke was willing to 
grant deference to the State of Washington’s concern about funding clergy 
education, especially when the burden on religion was quite minor.  As noted, 
such funding would not violate the Constitution, since any state monies that 
might flow to religious instruction would result from the independent and 
private choice of the student.373  The Court was willing, however, to 
acknowledge the special and significant historical concerns that accompanied 
state funding of ministers.374 
No such historical concerns exist, however, for use of public schools or 
other public facilities for religious worship.  Unlike financial support of 
ministry, a central concern that gave rise to the Establishment Clause, the 
historical record is devoid of concerns over use of public buildings for worship.  
If anything, use of public buildings for worship and religious meetings was 
accepted with little thought.  As noted by the district court opinion in the Bronx 
Household case, the founders had no issue making public buildings available 
 
that no person shall be “compelled to frequent or maintain, or contribute . . . [to] any particular place of 
worship, or particular ministry . . . .”  However, the Maryland Constitution allowed the legislature to levy a 
general tax for the support of religion, granting each person the power to decide where the money should go.  
See MD. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS OF 1776, § 33-34, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS:  THE 
DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS, supra note 369, at 17, 17-18.  Both Georgia and South Carolina 
had similar provisions.  See GA. CONST. of 1777, § LVI, reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS:  THE 
DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS, supra note 369, at 16, 16; S.C. CONST. of 1778, § XXXVIII, 
reprinted in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS:  THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS, supra note 369, 
at 39, 39-41. 
 371.  For example, both Massachusetts and Connecticut continued state financial support of established 
churches.  See LEVY, supra note 367, at 29-49. 
 372.  See CURRY, supra note 367, at 77 (reiterating Madison’s Remonstrance’s significance on 
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L.J. 43, 48-49 (1997) (describing purpose of Madison’s Remonstrance against passing bill). 
 373.  See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 719 (2004). 
 374.  See id. at 722-23. 
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for worship.375  Starting in 1795, George Washington permitted worship 
services in the U.S. Capitol building.376  Thomas Jefferson attended worship 
services in the House of Representatives within a year of taking office, and 
continued to regularly do so throughout his presidency.  James Madison 
similarly attended worship services in the Capitol during his two terms as 
president.  Indeed, services continued there until after the Civil War.  Further, 
the Supreme Court building, as well as the Treasury and War Office buildings, 
occasionally housed worship services.377 
Thus, the strong historical concerns that informed the Court in Locke are 
nonexistent in the context of worship services in public schools.  Further, as 
previously discussed, any such concerns under the Court’s current 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence are minimal at best.378  The Court has 
consistently held that the neutrality of any limited public forum that might 
include religious exercise mitigates Establishment Clause concerns.379  This is 
particularly true under the Court’s endorsement analysis, in which an objective 
observer would understand that worship services were permitted simply as part 
of the forum.  Therefore, the Second Circuit was incorrect in characterizing 
Establishment Clause concerns as “substantial” and similar to those in Locke; 
they were far from it.380 
This demonstrates that Locke is distinguishable from Bronx Household and 
similar situations where worship services are allowed in public schools 
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pursuant to a neutral and broader community-use policy.  Although two of the 
three factors emphasized in Locke—the minimal burden imposed and lack of 
animus—are admittedly similar, the third factor, the significant Establishment 
Clause concerns grounded in history, is completely absent.  This last factor 
appears to be the linchpin in Locke, and suggests that any exception to the 
general Smith and Lukumi prohibition on targeting religion for unfavorable 
treatment should not apply without it. Thus, strict scrutiny should apply, and 
the Board’s policy would not meet this standard. 
Admittedly, this free exercise analysis comes with a degree of uncertainty 
considering the limited nature of the Locke holding and the paucity of Supreme 
Court free exercise cases in this type of context.  Unlike the Free Speech and 
Establishment Clause issues discussed in Parts III and IV, where the Supreme 
Court clearly and reasonably developed its analysis in the context of the limited 
public forum, the “play in the joints” analysis relied on in Locke remains 
somewhat embryonic.  As such, this analysis suggesting that the school 
community-use policy excluding worship services violates the Free Exercise 
and Free Speech Clause, must be somewhat qualified. 
Nonetheless, the conclusion that the school community-use policy violates 
the Free Exercise Clause is the most sensible one.  Not only is Locke quite 
distinguishable, but applying strict scrutiny when religion is targeted for 
unfavorable treatment fits within the general tone and purposes of Smith and 
Lukumi.  In the final analysis, however, the presence or absence of a Free 
Exercise violation is not dispositive of the issue, since unequal treatment of 
religious speech, which occurs when religious worship services are excluded 
from a community-use program, clearly violates freedom of speech. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Government involvement with religion has long been, and continues to be, 
controversial.  This is not surprising considering the dangers posed by 
government promotion of religion and the need to accommodate religious 
exercise.  In recent years, the Supreme Court has sought to balance these 
competing concerns largely by focusing on neutral treatment of religion as 
required by the Free Speech and Free Exercise clauses.  Doing so serves to 
avoid concerns under the Establishment Clause.  This is particularly true in 
government created fora for speech, with the Court consistently holding that 
exclusion of religious speech from such fora violates the Free Speech Clause, 
and inclusion of religious speech on equal terms to other forms of speech does 
not violate the Establishment Clause. 
For this reason, the Second Circuit’s two recent decisions in the Bronx 
Household litigation upholding a New York City Board of Education policy 
excluding worship services from public schools were clearly wrong.  Although 
schools need not open their facilities for worship services, once a public forum 
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is created providing access to various groups, the school may not exclude 
worship services.  Contrary to the Second Circuit’s conclusion that a worship 
service is an activity rather than speech, worship services are an expressive 
event falling within the First Amendment, consisting of elements such as 
prayer, singing, and preaching that are clearly considered speech.  Moreover, 
any exclusion of worship services constitutes viewpoint discrimination, since 
views on some of life’s most important questions are inevitably different when 
expressed in the context of worship, revealing beliefs not fully captured in 
other formats. 
The Second Circuit also erred in concluding that there was a “strong basis” 
for the Board of Education to believe that permitting worship services in 
schools would violate the Establishment Clause.  The Supreme Court has 
consistently held that the neutral treatment in a public forum mitigates any 
Establishment Clause concerns that might otherwise exist.  In such situations, 
the content of any particular speech, religious or otherwise, is attributable to the 
participant in the forum, rather than government.  For this reason treating 
religion neutrally also mitigates any endorsement concerns that might exist. 
The exclusion of worship services would also likely violate the Free 
Exercise Clause, though this is admittedly less clear.  Current free exercise 
jurisprudence, as established in Smith and Lukumi, provides that government 
actions that target religion with unique burdens are subject to strict scrutiny, 
which cannot be met with regard to excluding worship services from public 
schools.  Although the Court held in Locke that exceptions might be made to 
this neutrality requirement where substantial Establishment Clause concerns 
exist, that would not be the case for worship services in schools.  Unlike Davey, 
which included strong historical concerns about funding training for the 
ministry, no such historical concerns exist regarding use of public buildings for 
worship services; in fact, the historical record indicates the founders had no 
problem with using public buildings for worship.  For that reason, the more 
general Smith and Lukumi standard should apply, making the distinct burden on 
worship services unconstitutional. 
 
